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ABSTRACT 
The international community is often challenged with stabilizing failing states that are 
incapable of providing security, health, food and water to their citizens.  Humanitarian 
concern about starvation, rapes, massacres, and oppression of the vulnerable in these 
states must be addressed.  These states may also provide safe havens for terrorists and 
other groups that become threats to global security.  The international community 
establishes complex missions with both a “soft approach” of providing only humanitarian 
aid and a stronger version that exercises binding power over local stakeholders.  This 
thesis analyzes these complex international interventions and argues that missions with 
binding power are more successful.  It begins with theoretical reasoning on why missions 
with binding power are expected to be successful and continues with empirical data 
through the comparison of 13 international missions in eight different countries.  Five of 
these international interventions in three countries are reviewed in detail.  The UNMIK 
and EULEX in Kosovo and UNOSOM in Somalia are considered as successful examples 
while the UNOSOM II and AMISOM in Somalia are failures. Finally, this thesis 
analyzes the current situation in Yemen and provides policy recommendations by 
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The purpose of this thesis is to explore why complex international interventions in 
failing states are not always successful and what should be done to better stabilize these 
states. The focus will be on how the binding power of the international actors over local 
government affects the success of international intervention. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The international community often struggles with reconstructing failing states.  In 
some cases the UN and other international actors succeed, while in others they fail.  It is 
imperative that the international community carefully study the lessons learned from past 
success and failure in order to develop strategies for future cases.  This thesis will 
examine several cases in order to better understand how the binding power of the 
international actors leads to a stabilized state.  Lessons learned will then be applied to 
outline the best course of action for stabilizing Yemen and to ensure success and stability 
in the region. 
Some failing states no longer have a functioning government, while some others 
have a partially functioning government that can only control a small part of the territory. 
Almost all are unable to provide basic services to their populations.
1
 People of these 
countries live in tragic conditions, as eloquently illustrated by William Russell Easterly:  
Almost three billion people live in poverty on less than two dollars a day, 
eight hundred and forty million people do not have enough to eat, 
approximately ten million children die every year from preventable and 
curable diseases, almost one billion people do not have access to clean 




                                                 
1John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, “Project MUSE -Toward Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” The 
Washington Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2002): 86. 
2 William Russell Easterly, The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest have 
done so Much Ill and so Little Good (London, Oxford University Press, 2007), 8. 
 2 
These failing state situations have the potential to affect both regional and 
international stability. Ungoverned territories provide safe havens for terrorists and 
criminal organizations which, in turn, will become a threat to other states.3 Therefore, it 
is vital that the international community unites their efforts, not just for the people of 
those failing states, but also for international security.                                               
This thesis scrutinizes complex international interventions that embrace military, 
humanitarian aid delivery, and observatory-advisory tasks that fall under two 
subcategories: the broad approach of nation building, and post-conflict reconstruction 
which is not as broad but comprehensive enough for all necessary short- and middle-term 
functions of state building.  To classify the necessary functions of post-conflict 
reconstruction, this thesis will use Robert C. Orr’s model of four pillars: safe and secure 
environment, government and participation, social and economic wellbeing of the 
population, and justice and reconciliation.
4 
 A brief overview of 13 interventions into 
eight countries will be provided.  These interventions are UN driven in such places as 
Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor (twice), Afghanistan, Cyprus, Sudan, Somalia (twice), 
African Union intervention in Somalia, and European Union intervention in Kosovo.   
International interventions into three of these countries will be scrutinized in 
detail, pillar by pillar: UN and EU interventions in Kosovo; UN, African Union and U.S. 
interventions in Somalia; and U.S., Gulf Corporation Council, and Saudi Arabian aid 
programs in Yemen.  UNMIK and EULEX in Kosovo and United Nations Operation in 
Somalia (UNOSOM) are viewed as successful examples of complex international 
interventions, while UNOSOM II and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
and international aid programs in Yemen are identified as examples of failure.  The 
selection process identified cases to demonstrate acceptable and unacceptable outcomes 
when the decision is made to intervene and applying the lessons learned to current 
situations such as the case in Yemen.  In these cases, the four pillars of the model will be 
compared and contrasted to demonstrate how the binding power of international actors 
                                                 
3 Robert C. Orr, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, ed. 
Robert C. Orr (Washington, D.C: CSIS Press, 2004), 3. 
4 Orr, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 15.  
 3 
affects mission success, followed by policy recommendations for the international 
community on how to intervene in Yemen and in future cases. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis addresses several questions, including: How should a complex 
international intervention of a failing state be launched?   Should the international 
community set up a mission with a binding power over local authorities?  Should they 
have power to impose rules and regulations, establish or restore and supervise local 
governments, inspect their activities, and hold officials accountable?   
 Within this analysis, the following hypothesis will be tested: Intervening actors 
must have binding executive power to manage the stabilization process and influence the 
target audience of the failing state. Some UN missions have failed due to the absence of 
binding power that would have enforced local governments’ compliance with universal 
norms.  Unfortunately, very little could be accomplished due to the fact that their 
mandate only allowed for the ability to monitor and provide advice that did not obligate 
the local government to follow.  In such missions, the UN failed to prevent reoccurrence 
of clashes between rival groups as happened several times in Sudan and Cyprus.  
Conversely, the UN always succeeded in the missions with binding power, such as the 
cases in Kosovo, East Timor, and Cambodia. Therefore, an intervention in Yemen would 
require a strong agreement be signed with the local government; this agreement would 
entail UN supervision over aid delivery, elections, and reforms.  The international 
interveners must have the authority to impose new rules and regulations over the existing 
government, provide guidance to the local actors, and hold them accountable for 
implementing advices. 
D. METHODOLOGY  
This thesis initially examines the broad conceptual knowledge relating to effects 
of international binding power on mission success and then uses case studies to compare 
and contrast good and bad examples of international intervention in order to draw lessons 
and demonstrate best practices.  Information covering 13 international interventions in 
eight countries such as Cambodia, Kosovo, East Timor, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Cyprus, 
 4 
and Afghanistan will be briefly reviewed.  The international interventions in three of 
these countries will be scrutinized using 4 pillars of post-conflict reconstruction; safe and 
secure environment, government and participation, economic and social wellbeing of the 
population, and justice and reconcilation.  The first case to be reviewed is the successful 
UN (United Nations) and EU (European Union) peacekeeping operations launched in 
1999 in Kosovo.  The second case covers two UN operations in Somalia: the first, 
UNOSOM in 1991, illustrates a successful example while the second mission, UNOSOM 
II, resulted in failure two years later.  The third and final case will involve Yemen and 
analysis of the efforts provided by the international actors such as the Gulf Cooperation 
Council, the United States and Saudi Arabia.  The analysis will prove that these efforts 

















II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. DEFINITIONS OF STATE, FAILING STATE AND TYPES OF 
INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 
1. A State and Its Core Functions 
A state is a legitimate sovereign entity in a territorially bounded land, able to 
provide basic services and impose rules over its population. According to Thomas 
Hobbes, a state is made up from the leadership of a charismatic leader and a social 
contract between this entity and the population.
5
  Others emphasize different factors to 
define a state. Max Weber highlights the importance of security and administrative 
control of the population. He defines a state simply as a “monopoly on the means of 
violence.”6  Robert I. Rotberg also agrees that the most important function of a state is 
security.  According to Rotberg, a state is an entity which delivers some positive political 
goods to its population and the most important political good is security.7   
Eliminating domestic threats and preventing crimes and other dangers to security 
is a top priority for any state to ensure its sovereignty.  As appropriately explained by 
Rotberg, other political goods can be delivered only when security is provided.  
Additionally, Rotberg argues that the second most important political good for a state is 
free participation.  In order for a state to function properly, citizens should be able to 
participate in the political process freely, openly and fully.  This participation provides 
respect and support to key institutions like courts and legislatures, including tolerance to 
opposition and differences.  Other important political goods are health care, education, 
banks, economic services, power, water, communication and transportation, 
infrastructure, and civil society.8 
                                                 
5 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Classics, 1982).   
6 Talcott Parsons, ed., Max Weber the Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 1964 ed. (NY: 
Free Press, 1947), 14. 
7 Robert I. Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), 3. 
8 Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, 3. 
 6 
Meierhenrich has a different view: the promotion of legality and bureaucracy are 
the most important tasks for a state as the two increase the trust among stakeholders.
9
  
Law has a symbolic value that signals what agents can expect from state and society and 
what they cannot, as well as facilitating the interaction among those indigenous agents. A 
strong bureaucracy is a key factor for a state to competently enforce necessary policies. 
Likewise, Ashraf Ghani and Claire Lockhart believe that the rule of law is the 
most important state function. They hold that a state must have ten key functions, with 
the most important being the rule of law. In their book, Fixing Failed States, Ghani and 
Lockhart tally nine other functions: monopoly on violence, administrative control, sound 
management of public finances, investments in human capital, the creation of citizenship 
rights, infrastructure services, market, management of public assets, and public 
borrowing. The authors define a state as “a dynamic, citizen-oriented mechanism that is 
necessary for the constitution of a legitimate economic, social, and political order.”10   
Building off of Ghani and Lockhart’s argument, this thesis will examine how the 
binding power of the international interveners affect the ten functions under the model of 









                                                 
9 Jens Meierhenrich, “Forming States After Failure,” in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, 
ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton University, 2004), 156–157. 
10 Ghani, Ashraf and Lockhart, Clare, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured 
World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 125–126. 
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Table 1.   Alignment of the ten functions with the Four Pillar model 
2. Strong, Failing and Failed States 
States can be classified as strong, failing, or failed states according to their 
performance in delivering the core functions mentioned above.  Strong states perform 
well across these categories, creating a virtuous cycle in which authority translates into 
collective power that is kept accountable to the citizenry.11  Failing states can be defined 
as countries with a dysfunctional government, unable to provide some of the basic 
services to citizenry, without access and control over a significant part of the territory.  
Citizens start to lose their trust in the state and conflict can easily flare up between groups 
that compete for power.  If one party clearly wins, the new state is established; otherwise, 
the state will continue to fail.  
At a certain point, it becomes impossible for the indigenous actors to reestablish 
the state and international assistance becomes vital.  A failed state can no longer provide 
for its citizens and in return the government no longer receives support.  In many failed 
states, troops fight against an armed insurgency, sometimes facing more than one rival 
simultaneously. Paul Collier points to a set of problems that traps these countries from 
progressing: civil war, a dependence on the extraction and export of natural resources, 
                                                 




  These states are desperately in need of international assistance 
due to the corruption and incompetent institutions failing to provide solutions to 
entrenched problems.  If operations are left unsupervised they are likely to undermine the 
humanitarian operations and continue to exploit the goodwill of the international 
communities. Therefore, just observing and advising is not enough; the recommendations 
must be enforced with a binding power to keep them on a correct path with international 
values.   
3. Is it Possible to Prevent State Failure?        
It is easier to solve a problem before it intensifies.  However, the problem must be 
identified in this phase in order to apply the correct solutions.  Although there are ways to 
predict state failure and address the symptoms and causes, the international community 
tends to not intervene in a timely manner.  The intervention generally comes when the 
situation severely worsens.  There are several reasons for this delay such as slow and 
tiresome decision making mechanisms of the international community, differing national 
interests, competition for power, and different ideological approaches.  
Another handicap to a solution is a regional deficiency over cooperation. Weak 
and small states lack the support from their neighbors and they can prove harmful to each 
other.  Paul Collier states:  
Despite the fact that smaller countries need more cooperation with their 
neighbors in order to supply public goods that are difficult to undertake 
alone within their own sovereignty, this cooperation is not obtained due to 
the mistrust of their neighbors.
13
   
For example, one country would not want to place all of its dependence on electrical 
power provided by a neighboring country.  Therefore, they are unable to overcome this 
obstacle without assistance from the international community.   
                                                 
12 Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done 
About It (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 140.  
13 Collier, The Bottom Billion, 191.  
 9 
David Carment argues that it is important to do something as early as possible, 
but the international community is consistently slow in understanding the early 
indications of state failure.   
State failure is mostly understood after they actually fail or collapse and 
the problem becomes harder to solve. Correct methods of monitoring 
activities and analytic calculations of the symptoms can assist in 
predicting state failure. Once diagnosed, the state failure can be prevented 
by applying coercive methods of preventive diplomacy and alleviate 
conflict.14  
 However, if the failure cannot be prevented, the situation will continue to be 
exacerbated with dense ethnic conflicts, killings, rapes, starvation, diseases and many 
other kinds of human made disasters.  Although the process of the international 
community is slow, the media and democratic reactions of the masses in the developed 
countries have spurred the international community to intervene more swiftly.  In most 
cases, the actual intervention normally occurs after the aid-only operations by 
international NGOs that arrived earlier to help the victims of statelessness.  
4. State Building from Within vs. from Outside 
Strayer eloquently states, “A state exists chiefly in the hearts and minds of its 
people; if they do not believe it is there, no logical exercise will bring it to life.”15 Once 
failed, the state can only be restored if underwritten by indigenous agents with a stake in 
its continuation.  Jens Meierhenrich suggests that during the process of state formation or 
intervention, these agents have two choices: to steal the state or to preserve it.16  If the 
stake holders believe that the state will protect their interests with regard to property, 
rights, representation or power, they will support it; otherwise they will pursue short-term 
personal benefits.   
                                                 
14 David Carment, “Preventing State Failure,” in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed. 
Robert I. Rotberg (Forming States after Failure: Forming States after Failure, 2004), 135–136. 
15Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2005), as cited by Meierhenrich, Forming States after Failure, 155. 
16 Meierhenrich, Jens. “Forming States after Failure” in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, 
edited by Robert I. Rotberg. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University), 2004, 154. 
 10 
We acknowledge that a functional state can only be set up from within; however, 
international support is still vital for post-conflict reconstruction.  Once the actual state 
failure starts, the indigenous actors are no longer capable of providing the most urgent 
tasks such as security and aid delivery.  A safe and secure environment is vital for aid 
delivery as well as all future efforts of the reconstruction.  Only the international actors 
are capable of addressing this emergency.  Once these two provisions are attained, the 
trust of the local community through the state will increase as will international donations 
and aid. Finally the interveners can pass to the next level of institution building and long 
term development goals. 
5. Is International Intervention the Answer? 
Rotberg states, “Intervention using diplomacy and humanitarian aid should be the 
primary strategy as opposed to direct military action.”17  This approach is generally 
accepted by the international community and the failing state itself, because it doesn’t 
lead to the perception of occupation.  So when is it necessary to intervene and how 
should it be done?  Military intervention should only be used to correct a mass violation 
of human rights after assessing if genocide or other large-scale killing and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law are being committed.  As for how it should 
be done, it is essential to use force that is proportional to the size of the threat with a 
technology as a force multiplier in line with universal values.  
Ultimately, it is paramount for the international community to have an assembly 
that is unbiased to support humanitarian efforts.  Mistakes will be made whether 
governments are run by the people or a dictator.  If those mistakes include human rights 
violations by one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), then other actions must be taken to make change or consider a restructuring of 
the UNSC and how the members maintain a permanent status.  The UNSC is such an 
institution that is allowed to interfere in the internal affairs of another state.  However, the 
UNSC can be seen as hypocritical at times when they fail to act for countries by turning a 
blind eye to one while deciding to enact military involvement for another.  A bad 
                                                 
17 Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, 5–7. 
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reputation plagues the UNSC for ignoring atrocities such as the Syrian government and 
failing to act in a timely matter for other cases; however, a quick reaction to the recent 
events in Libya has raised the hopes for future interventions. 
In the analysis of Yemen’s ongoing issues, we can see that this politically tense 
country is home to many of the problems that constitute the definition of a “failing state.”  
Terrorism, lack of basic services, political tension, and ethno-religious disputes are all 
present.  If Yemen was a human body, it would be rushed to the emergency room and 
transferred to the Intensive Care Unit for long-term monitoring and recovery.  In terms of 
prevention, it is evident that both forms of intervention may be necessary to include 
humanitarian assistance and some form of military intervention or peacekeeping force.     
Aid and military intervention are both very costly, one in terms of money and the 
other in terms of blood.  As generally suggested, aid is viewed with “diminishing 
returns:” the more aid given over time, the less effective it is in fixing problems and 
stabilizing states.
18
 Military intervention, on the other hand, can trigger a national 
backlash from the population.  As for the observatory-advisory missions, they are 
routinely incompetent due to the lack of administrative power.  This leaves complex 
international interventions as the preferred scenario: a combination of military, 
humanitarian aid and observatory-advisory tasks, enforced with binding power.  Binding 
power is the key ingredient to ensure that the local government and officials enact 
reforms and other recommendations provided by the international professionals.  It means 
the international interveners must be competent and their advice must be mandatory for 
the local governments. Otherwise, incompetent and corrupt local governments will 
hamper the intervention.   
B. INTERVENTION TYPES 
International intervention comes in four categories: aid-only, military, 
observatory-advisory, and complex interventions.  Aid-only interventions are good for 
new cases and usually done by international NGOs or UN institutions.  But in more 
complex cases, this approach is often too weak for the harsh conditions of post conflict 
                                                 
18Collier, The Bottom Billion, 100. 
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environments.  Security of the operation and personnel, for example, are left to the mercy 
of incompetent local government forces or armed groups.  By the same token, 
observatory missions are another form of soft approach to intervention.  The personnel of 
these international missions can only conduct observations, provide advice to local 
institutions with no obligation, and send their reports to the UN headquarters.  This 
incompetent hands-off approach does not match with the actual necessities and realities 
of the field.  As with humanitarian aid programs, the observatory and advisory missions 
are more useful when used as part of a complex international intervention. 
Because of the importance of security, military intervention has a significant 
prominence for interventions.  Often the security situation deteriorates in post-conflict 
areas and these weak countries are vulnerable to military coups and occupation by 
neighboring countries with their own agenda.  The forces of these failing states are 
generally incapable of providing services and are generally part of the problem rather 
than the solution. The neutrality of multinational militaries makes them the best security 
providers for these states.19  Paul Collier ascertains that military intervention in failing 
states can expel an aggressive force, restore order, maintain peace, and prevent coups.20      
In addition, military forces can help with the task of aid delivery and take the lead 
in some developmental projects.  However, they are likely to face duration and footprint 
dilemmas triggering a backlash from the local population and will be perceived as 
occupying forces. These dilemmas will be explained in the security pillar later in this 
chapter.  Like aid-only and observatory missions, military interventions can only be 
useful as long as they are used as part of a complex intervention.  In this domain, 
unilateral military interventions are more susceptible than multilateral intervention.  UN 
interventions receive more tolerance than all others due to its universality and neutrality.  
For that reason, UN missions are generally able to intervene more intrusively and for a 
                                                 
19 Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, The Dilemmas of State-building: Confronting the 
Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations (London: Routledge, 2009) 81. 
20 Collier, The Bottom Billion, 124. 
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A well-planned military intervention is a must 
during the preparation and support of complex interventions.  
Complex international interventions combine all the types noted above in a way 
that increases their effectiveness while decreasing dilemmas and other shortcomings 
previously mentioned.  However, it is important to remember that complex interventions 
is not a guaranteed formula of success.   Aid can be delivered in a safe condition that is 
provided by international forces, and local institutions can observe and receive advice for 
awareness and enhancement.
22
  This thesis argues that complex international 
interventions are more applicable and well-fitting to post-conflict situations as opposed to 
single approach interventions and are more likely to succeed when granted a strong 
mandate with binding administrative power over local stake holders.    
C. EVOLUTION OF COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION: 
NATION BUILDING VS. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION               
Complex international interventions can be classified into two groups: nation 
building and post-conflict reconstruction.  Nation building is a broad and long-term 
solution, while post-conflict reconstruction refers to a mid- or short-term strategy for a 
quick response.  Nation building starts with the creation of a national identity and 
institution building of a new regime focused on resolving all the root causes of the 
conflict. Although this process takes too much time for the international community, it is 
very effective for the long run.  Post-conflict reconstruction, on the other hand, focuses 
on restoring or constructing a state with most of the fundamental functions and then 
moves to middle-term goals of development.  It provides emergency relief including 
security and humanitarian aid delivery that a failing state is desperately in need of.     
Goals of nation building, such as creation of a national identity, long term 
development, and resolving conflict, are normally beyond the scope of external actors.  
The people of a country and their leaders must be the ones who achieve these long-term 
goals; although one would hope for international support.
23
 Unfortunately, nation 
                                                 
21 Paris and Sisk, The Dilemmas of State-Building, 82. 
22 Paris and Sisk, The Dilemmas of State-Building, 100. 
23Orr, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 12. 
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building has some negative connotations because of the etymology itself, as well as 
historical disappointments of the U.S. There is great potential for misunderstandings such 
as outsiders building the nation and ignoring the role of local actors.  It also becomes too 
comprehensive to match the short- and mid-term goals to create a minimally capable state 
and can endanger the peace in return.
24 
 
The successes in nation building operations in Germany, Japan and Korea from 
1945 until 1960 were a direct result of being well established nations that were rebuilt 
after devastating wars.  However,  the U.S. failed in Latin America and Vietnam where it 
tried to establish American-friendly regimes as a strategy while using the military as the 
primary tool.  Therefore, in theoretical discussions, there has been a shift from the term 
“nation building” to “post-conflict reconstruction,” although the two have much in 
common in terms of what to do with failing states.
25
 
The first international intervention began in ancient times when countries began 
to establish territorial control.  In modern times, nation building operations became the 
term used by the United States during international intervention. As the strongest and 
most developed country in the world, the U.S. started its nation building efforts in the 
beginning of 20th century and became the most active nation builder in the world.  Its 
involvement in nation building started with colonialism in the Philippines, and through 
gunboat diplomacy in the Caribbean and Central America, seeking to establish friendly 
governments.
26
  After World War II, the U.S. shifted from nation building operations to 
the reconstruction of Europe and Japan.  During the 1960s and 1970s, nation building 
efforts in Vietnam and South Asia were used as a means to prevent the spread of 
Communism.  The second generation of nation building efforts of the U.S. was 
dominated through international humanitarian interventions to failing states, followed by 
a third generation that started with the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, a mix of 
humanitarian, democracy building, and counterterrorism operations.
27
   
                                                 
24Hamre and Sullivan, Toward Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 90. 
25Hamre and Sullivan, Toward Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 89. 
26Orr, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,  4. 
27Orr, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 4. 
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As for the UN, during the Cold War it dealt with peacekeeping operations to 
oversee border disputes, supervise elections and uphold ceasefires.  After the Cold War, 
the number of missions increased and duties became more complex, spanning from 
providing security operations to aid delivery, and taking on civilian duties to institution 
building.
28
   
The term “post-conflict reconstruction” was first used by the World Bank in 1995 
and defined as “rebuilding the socioeconomic framework of the society and 
reconstruction of the enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society to include 
the framework for governance and rule of law.”29  John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan 
classified its four pillars, which are later followed by Robert C. Orr in his book Winning 
the Peace.
30
 Orr defines post-conflict reconstruction as “a donation of efforts by outside 
actors to help local actors build a minimally capable state in four key areas; security, 
governance and participation, social and economic wellbeing, and justice and 
reconciliation.”31 These pillars are well ordered and comprehensive enough to classify 
Ghani and Lockhart’s ten functions or Rotberg’s fundamental political goods and 
therefore will be used as the model of the thesis. 
D. PRINCIPLES OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION                                
Since each case has different causes, processes, and outcomes, there is not a “one 
fits all” solution to failing states.  However, we can establish main principles of post-
conflict reconstruction to make the subject clear. These principles are “binding power by 
the international interveners,” good timing, security and aid delivery first, feedback, 
accountability, local participation, avoiding perception of occupation, and respect to 
cultures and religions.  
                                                 
28Daniel Silander, “The United Nations and Peace Building: Lessons from the UN Transitional 
Administrations in East Timor and Kosovo,” Social Alternatives 28, no. 2 (2009): 23–28. 
29John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, “Toward Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” Project MUSE 
2011, 89. 
30Orr, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 10–12.  
31Orr, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, 10. 
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Binding power of the interveners is perhaps the most important factor for 
international intervention. It means the international interveners must be competent and 
their advice and recommendations must be mandatory for the local governments. 
Otherwise the incompetent and corrupt local governments will hamper the intervention.  
The fact that they are too incompetent to fulfill their tasks is the primary reason the 
interveners are there mustn’t be forgotten.  In the harsh conditions of post-conflict 
environment, monitoring and advising the inept and corrupted officials are not enough to 
achieve the difficult goals of reconstruction.  Most of the advisory UN missions fail due 
to the unamenable behavior of the local partners. In some cases, the governmental 
elements hindered international efforts.  As an example, and to be discussed later in the 
Somalia case, some government soldiers halted traffic and collected taxes from vehicles 
passing by, including aid delivery vehicles.  If they refused to pay, the aid trucks were not 
allowed passage. 
Timing of the intervention is equally important: not too early and certainly not too 
late.  An early involvement can cause a hostile response from the armed groups that fail 
to realize the need for the international intervention. Another drawback for this approach 
can be the fact that sometimes countries in trouble can develop their own measures or 
internal dynamics that can help recover itself without international engagement.  As was 
the case in Egypt this year (2011), when international actors started considering an 
intervention to help the people of this country, the dictatorial president’s resignation 
suddenly stopped the civil disobedience. An intervention that is too late on the other hand 
may have led to escalation of the conflict. 
The international intervention should start with the provision of security and 
delivery of humanitarian aid. A safe and secure environment is vital for aid delivery and 
all other steps of reconstruction. Once these two steps are attained, the trust of the local 
community through the state will increase and the international focus will be able to shift 
to longer-term development goals.   
Feedback and accountability are additional factors that are important to the 
process.  As Easterly underscores, the flow of feedback from the field must be provided 
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and the people involved should be held accountable for their actions.
32
  This is 
comparable to customers sending feedback when buying or returning products and 
holding the manufacturer responsible if the product proves to be of low quality.  
Similarly, there is a need for feedback and accountability in state building operations.
 Local participation is another important principle to the post-conflict 
reconstruction that fosters the willingness to join others in voting and attending 
community meetings. It identifies a willingness to solve the problems collectively within 
the community.  It is important to capitalize on creating the sense of being “better off” 
and of optimism among the average citizen.  Having more money isn’t the only thing that 
determines being “better off”; having trust in government and the rule of law is just as 
critical to achieve these feelings.  By focusing on these elements or attitudes of the 
populace, the trade-off makes it more difficult for rebel movements to secure recruits by 
raising the opportunity cost of defection to join the rebel cause.
33
 
Respecting the culture and religion of the area also gives the perception among 
the population that the outside actors are working in their best interest. To avoid the 
opposite reaction, unilateral interventions and a large footprint approach should be 
circumvented. Personnel must be trained in the cultural and religious style of the 
indigenous groups; impartiality must always be displayed towards cultural discrepancies 
amongst ethnic or religious rival groups.  In Somalia, American soldiers were welcomed 
as saviors in 1992.  However, within one year developments there caused attitudes to 
reverse and the U.S. was viewed negatively through the exploitation of mistakes and 
provocation from warlords.  
Avoiding unilateral approaches and perception of occupation is paramount: 
international intervention should not have any other goal than humanitarian concern and 
global security.  These goals are easily appreciated and can engender more trust by the 
 
 
                                                 
32 Easterly, The White Man’s Burden, 5–7. 
33 Jennifer A. Widner, “Building Effective Trust in the Aftermath of Severe Conflict,” in When States 
Fail, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton University: Princeton University Press, 2004), 224. 
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host population, and increases international participation for the operations. A unilateral 
intervention by a neighboring country will trigger nationalist resentment and exacerbate 
the harsh situation in the country.  
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III. BINDING POWER AND THE FOUR PILLARS OF POST-
CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 
This chapter scrutinizes these four pillars and applies the hypothesis to understand 
how the binding power of international actors over local authorities affects mission 
success.  After explaining the concept theoretically in this chapter, the research continues 
with case studies in Chapter IV. This process identifies 15 interventions in nine different 
countries by taking a closer look at the UN interventions in Cambodia, Kosovo, East 
Timor (twice), Afghanistan (twice), Kashmir, Cyprus, Sudan, Somalia (twice), African 
Union intervention of Somalia, and the European Union intervention in Kosovo.  
Analysis of interventions in three countries that involved UNMIK and EULEX in 
Kosovo, UNOSOM, UNOSOMII, and AMISOM in Somalia and the aid programs in 
Yemen are detailed and scrutinized, pillar by pillar.    
A. FIRST PILLAR: A SAFE AND SECURE ENVIRONMENT 
Security is perhaps the most important pillar, with major effects providing an 
umbrella over all other pillars.  It includes protecting the lives of the civilians and the 
territorial integrity of the country.  Therefore, the intervention should first aim to stop the 
conflict and then commence emergency aid deliveries to the people in need, only then 
can the goal shift to long-term development and reconstruction.  Unfortunately, in post-
conflict environments, the security situation is deteriorated with indigenous forces being 
inept in providing security, and in most cases they become part of the problem rather than 
the solution.  Therefore, it is necessary to provide security by international forces and 
empower them with binding power to ensure that local security functions within the 
universal norms and laws. 
The international interveners should also be granted power to establish security 
forces and indoctrinate them with contemporary universal norms. When the local forces 
are established or reformed by international interveners, they will be capable, responsive 
to civil political leadership without undermining the rights of its citizens.
34
 Thus, they 
                                                 
34 Marina Ottaway and Stephan Mair, States at Risk and Failed States (Germany: SWP German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs, [September 2004]), 7–9. 
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will most likely gain support from the population.  Additionally, it creates employment, 
helps reconciliation and increases local participation. International organizations should 
have a powerful mandate to simultaneously advise military and civilian members through 
proper behavior and keep all local actors under control with a carrot and stick approach.
35 
   
1. Importance of Military Intervention in the Security Pillar 
Military intervention is inescapable for many of the post-conflict environments 
due to the fact that security plays a crucial role throughout all pillars of reconstruction 
and local forces are generally incapable to provide it.  Military intervention can be 
avoided if the local military respects human life such as the case in Egypt during the Arab 
Spring in early 2011.  International militaries are the best source for security for these 
states, as long as they are granted binding power over local institutions.  If they are 
equipped with a strong mandate, the four essential tasks of Paul Collier can be fulfilled: 
to expel an aggressive force, restore order, maintain the peace, and prevent coups.
36 
 In 




Although international militaries have useful roles in reconstruction operations as 
mentioned above, military intervention must not be the sole option or even the principal 
part of the reconstruction.
38
  According to Hamre and Sullivan, international civilian 
administrators, private sector affiliates, and NGO members have great advantages 
compared to the military, because there will be no perception of occupation.
39 
 Therefore, 
international military intervention must avoid the appearance of occupation and at the 
very least demonstrate a symbolic multinational participation.  Reducing the footprint in 
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conjunction with transferring the duties and responsibilities over to the indigenous forces 
should be a gradual process as the focus shifts to training and supervising the local forces. 
2. DDR (Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration) 
Disarmament is defined by the UN as the collection, documentation, control and 
disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, light and heavy weapons of combatants 
and often within the civilian population.40  Demobilization includes the discharge of 
former combatants and reinserting them into the community as unarmed citizens with 
new occupations.  The predominant task of DDR is the disarmament operation that 
requires binding power of international actors.  This entire program is important for the 
development of the country, sustainable peace, security, and economic recovery.  
B. SECOND PILLAR: GOVERNMENT AND PARTICAPATION 
This pillar includes the creation of a legitimate and effective government and its 
political and administrative institutions with participation of the local population.  A 
representative constitutional structure, a strengthened public sector administration, and a 
healthy civil society should be accomplished.  Both tasks of government and 
participation require a comprehensive binding power by international interveners.  
The binding power is particularly important in means of government because it is 
a difficult task for a failing state to govern in the post-conflict environment.  Where there 
is an existing government with acceptable levels of legitimacy, it can be strengthened and 
modified into a modern functioning government.  Otherwise, a new provisional 
government should be established through fair elections.  Should the government be 
restored or established, there is a high probability of it being incompetent and corrupt.  
An existing government will lack power with little or no inspecting mechanisms due to 
the failing state situation, while inexperience of a new government will lead to corruption 
and incompetency.  In both cases, the interveners must have a powerful mandate to 
supervise the local institutions until they have matured enough to function properly.   
                                                 
40 United Nations, “United Nations Policy for Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income 
Generation and Reintegration | Relief Web “ last modified May 1, 2008. http://reliefweb.int/node/24753.  
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The binding power is also important in terms of participation. Due to the lack of a 
democratic culture, local governments will not allow the media to make criticisms or 
allow people to participate.  The international actors should support the civil society and 
media to ensure the public voice is heard regarding advice for and criticisms of 
governmental activities.   
1. Civil Society  
Civil society is made up of groups, organizations, and associations outside of state 
control, but can affect the quality of governmental performance.
41
  According to Daniel 
N. Posner, when the pool is filled with positive groups, they improve the lives of the 
people as well as cooperative behavior in the community.  Conversely, if they are filled 
by mafia, warlords or crime organizations, violence and distrust will be the reign 
supreme.  As a state begins to fail, the favorable aspects of civil society accompanies the 
downward spiral, while the malicious groups manage to strengthen their positions.  
The civil society can substitute some basic services when the weak or toppled 
governmental institutions are unable to provide them.
42
  Therefore, the intervention 
should focus on building up the civil society to help reconstruction efforts and to increase 
awareness within the population. This can be done with direct support such as providing 
funds and material, or indirect support through the enhancement of communication 
means such as television, radios, newspapers, and telephone networks.  Additionally, the 
civil society should be protected from warlords and gangs and simultaneously ensure that 
the government and its forces are kept under control to allow the freedom of the civil 
society to grow and strengthen.
43 
  
2. Media                                                                                                                           
Media can function as a means to increase accountability and transparency of the 
government as long as the freedom of press is guaranteed.  Otherwise, the government 
                                                 
41 Daniel N. Posner, “Civil Society and the Reconstruction of Failed States,” in When States Fail: 
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42 Posner, Civil Society and the Reconstruction of Failed States, 240. 
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may intimidate those who speak out or, as Susan Rose-Ackerman maintains, manipulate 
the media with direct payments to the journalist.
44  
It is important that the media remain 
unbiased and free of government control for the dual benefit of not just informing the 
public of what the government is doing, but also for informing the government of what 
the people think about policies. In the missions with a strong mandate, the international 
interveners can ensure that the government does not suppress the media.  
In some cases the media can be under the control of warlords and broadcast their 
hate propaganda against other groups as well as the intervening forces.  There is a need 
for the interveners to disseminate necessary information to the population and a free local 
media must be established and supported.  The population must be kept informed about 
peacekeeping operations, aid delivery, mine cleaning, refuge returns, and security 
operations.
45
  Any shortcomings of the local media should be addressed as well; in some 
countries they may need a new inventory of equipment, while others require awareness 
programs.  Some may even require training; media members under authoritarian regimes 
may have missed the developments in the media realm including technological 
innovations, liberal and ethical improvements.     
3. Democratic Institution Building 
When states fail, the social and political elements are gradually replaced by 
militias, criminal gangs, or warlords.  In order to reverse this course, interveners should 
transform these elements back into the state and societal institutions.  Terrence Lyons 
states, “Democracy is the remedy here: elective commissions should be established and 
supported to run fair elections, build institutions, and solve problems through peaceful 
methods of negotiations and consensus building.”46 The most significant feature of a 
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democratic environment is its ability to allow peaceful coexistence of different social 
groups.  This peaceful feature minimizes the risk of transformations of disputes and 
differences into armed conflict.
47
  
The UN describes three main elements of democracy: free and fair elections, 
freedom of expression, and freedom of association.
48
  These elements are interdependent.  
Although a free election is the core of the three, it requires the supplement of the other 
two elements.  Citizens must be given the liberty to express their ideas and political 
views, they must be able to organize and participate in political parties with the right to 
vote and campaign for office.  As the European Court of Human Rights stated, political 
parties are vital for democracy with their exceptional contribution to political discussion.  
However, freedom of association is not confined to political parties; a wide range of 
liberty supports a peaceful assembly such as trade unions, worker organizations and the 
full spectrum of social, economic, and cultural associations.  This freedom needs to 
include a guarantee against obligatory membership and restrictions such as prior 
permission of the state. Freedom of expression is closely linked to freedom of 
association; the people who are using their right to assemble, vote, and run for election 
must be free to speak their minds.  Free and open public debates are a necessary 
precondition for a free and fair election.  
These three elements are boiled down to the major components of stabilization 
and reconstruction operations.    The traditional UN peacekeeping missions evolved and 
transformed into a new method during the 1990s; composition of militarily intervention, 
facilitate elections, and supervise newly established democratic government.  The UN 
introduced democracy in its new missions with a mandate to establish democratic 
institutions and promote democratic principles. After the decolonization processes, the 
electoral support by the UN shifted towards establishing comprehensive executive state 
building missions.  This would ensure the creation of a democratic regime to implement 
elections and facilitate freedom of assembly and freedom of expression.  One such 
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comprehensive mission was the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) that rendered the right to run elections, or establish local institutions to run 
elections, and issued binding directives over all governmental institutions with the right 
to suspend or abolish existing laws according to the Paris Agreement on February 16, 
1991.   The Cambodia example of promoting democracy in peacekeeping operations was 
followed by East Timor, Kosovo, Afghanistan and the Iraq interventions. 
 Cambodia’s unique example achieved unprecedented success, largely due to its 
strong mandate and binding power.  The international community managed to establish a 
favorable environment in which the elections were able to proceed, the individuals and 
political groups enjoyed the freedom of speech and participation in political 
organizations.  
C. THIRD PILLAR: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELLBEING OF THE 
POPULATION  
1. Aid Delivery  
The third pillar supports the functions of the economy and the wellbeing of the 
population.  The beginning of this pillar is normally started with emergency relief and 
often operated in conjunction with the security pillar in the first phases of the 
intervention.  In some cases, however, these operations may start before any security 
apparatus is in place.  International NGOs and UN aid workers bear great risk to deliver 
humanitarian supplies such as food, medicine, shelter, blanket, clothes, and basic medical 
treatment where little security exists.  If the conditions are chaotic and dire, international 
police forces will be required to provide security and support for aid delivery activities.  
This process is a must in order to allow the fruition of the humanitarian aid, which in turn 
allows for the situation to improve in the country.   
As the situation moves past the initial phase of emergency relief, the mission 
becomes more focused on the restoration of basic services such as education and health.  
Infusions to jump-start the markets and rehabilitate the economy with funds and a 
comprehensive development program will also be required during this phase.  In order to 
see this aspect from another point a view, the economy requires a jolt to revitalize and 
spur confidence in the country much like a patient requiring electro shock treatment to 
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revive their pulse.  Fostering growth, improving infrastructure and reducing poverty is the 
primary objective of these development programs.  The international actors must have the 
capacity to control these activities with direct supervision over the local institutions when 
they carry out these duties.  Otherwise, the aid, material and funds are jeopardized 
through misuse or even stolen as official contracts can be given in a corrupt, 
discriminatory and nepotistic manner.  
2. Stabilization of the Economy 
As seen in most post-conflict environments, economic conditions will perish, 
commerce will die away, the labor force will lose its skill base, agricultural areas will be 
destroyed, factories will be closed, and crimes against property will increase. 
Furthermore, the government will be incompetent, officials will be corrupt, and the 
people will be poor.  Corruption hampers economic growth, disproportionately burdens 
the poor, undermines the rule of law, and reduces the credibility of the government.  
Therefore, it is essential to minimize corruption to recover the economy rapidly.
49
 To 
stabilize these terrible economic conditions, according to Dobbins et al., “the intervention 
must foster and create conditions that are favorable for individuals to safely and 
profitably carry out their shopping, selling, transportation, and banking.”50  
In short order, priority should be given to the recovery of the economy. 
Unfortunately, the interveners sometimes push the country at a pace that rapidly increases 
the gap between their revenues and the budget.  When the economy grows and the signs 
become clear that stability and growth are now sitting with a solid foothold, the next step 
is to address the policy of collecting taxes in order to generate revenue that will assist in 
sustaining the government and social programs.   
The international efforts may have inadvertent consequences that can undermine 
the local economy. During deployments to Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, a common 
theme occurred of hiring local and higher educated workers as interpreters or manual 
laborers at a much higher rate than what the local economy provided.  This created a 
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brain drain of human capital normally required to assist in the actual recovery of the 
failing state.  Likewise, providing free aid material may harm the local producers who 
sell the same materials.   
3. Employment Creation 
In order to achieve a functioning economy, employment creation programs should 
be launched.  Young males that are unemployed pose a danger to the safe and secure 
environment; therefore, they should be kept engaged with skilled training or daily jobs.  
Small businesses must be supported and facilitated; however aid must be balanced to 
prevent a distortion of the businesses that are supplying the market.
51
 These programs 
should also produce opportunities for the local entrepreneurs to generate their own job 
creating activities.  Additionally, the governmental pay system is crucial for a healthy job 
market that must be supported through financial aid until the economy recovers.  This 
creates a system that allows the government to hire personnel who provide services to the 
citizens, and in return increases the potential for tax collection. 
4. Agriculture 
Since most failing states are agricultural communities, agricultural assistance 
programs are very important to post-conflict reconstruction.  It is not just producing fruits 
and vegetables, but it has a great impact on other sectors of the economy.   
Agricultural programs should start with supplying the needs of the populace and 
then continue with systems that protect the market and sponsor countryside 
employment.
52
  For long-term goals, scientific research of increasing agricultural 
efficiency and village-based seed enterprises enables the community to produce its own 
seeds and other goods for the market.    
The poorest elements of the population, in particular landless villagers, must be 
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integrated into the national programs of development through capacity building 
activities.
53
  Success will be higher as it includes most of the people in need, which in 
turn will create a longer lasting popular support. 
5. Infrastructure 
The infrastructure during the majority of post-conflict environments are almost 
always destroyed or ruined.  Roads, bridges, public buildings, ports, electric, water, and 
sewage systems are normally in need of being immediately rebuilt or repaired.
54
  These 
tasks should be undertaken by international interveners or supervised and audited over 
the local institutions once the controls begin to transfer.  This gives little room for 
corruption as contracts are closely monitored and supervised. 
Electricity and water have extreme importance for the impoverished people of the 
war-torn countries.  Although these networks require coinage to establish and operate, 
once functional they will generate revenue for the government to maintain these services. 
D. FOURTH PILLAR: JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION  
For the pillar of justice and reconciliation, it is imperative to establish legitimate, 
impartial and accountable judicial, correctional and law enforcement systems. The 
international actors must have a strong binding power to train and supervise the local 
court and law enforcement systems to prevent corruption.   
The vital areas to justice include rule of law, the criminal process, property rights, 
contracts, transparency and accountability, and regulations for private businesses.  The 
task of reconciliation, on the other hand, involves grievances and past abuses from the 
conflict.  This will have an enormous effect on the population due to a common sentiment 
of hatred, lack of trust, and a vote of no confidence among the post-conflict populations.  
Reconciling the issues between ex-combatants, perpetrators and their victims, and 
prosecuting previous crimes are essential. 
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1. Rule of Law 
Rule of law requires equality, fairness, openness, and legal accountability of 
public officials bound through the social contract between the ruler and the ruled.
55
 In 
post-conflict countries law and order is generally broken down and replaced by rule of 
the strong.  The laws should be compatible with universal norms, promulgated clearly, 
and binding for everybody including the rulers.  According to Rose-Ackerman, some of 
these tasks may be difficult or even undesired of a fledging government in a failing state 
and therefore international supervision is essential.     
2. Courts and Correction Systems 
A free, impartial and independent court system must be established with trained 
personnel in judicial values that are universal. Both judges and prosecutors must be 
controlled like their international peers who are granted an appropriate salary to stave off 
corruption and given the appropriate power to fight corruption.  This aspect is also 
important within corrections officers, court clerks, and the police force.  
3. Police Force 
The primary roles of the police forces are to enforce the law, protect the 
vulnerable, and fight crime and corruption. But in post-conflict environments these forces 
are generally corrupt due to low salaries and lack of awareness. The international 
interveners must be equipped with administrative power to increase legitimacy of the 
police through inspections, training programs, in-service control mechanisms, community 
policing methods and increased salaries.  A decent police force can uphold law and order 
as well as guarantee individual rights and freedoms.  
4. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions  
Although there are not a lot of examples, truth commissions may also be adopted 
by the indigenous population and with oversight from interveners . The perpetrators of 
the old crimes were confronted by the victims, and in some cases the perpetrators were 
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not punished if they confessed their crimes and apologized to their victims.  These 
commissions can build communal peace and reunite the fragmented parts of the 
community.  
5. Economic Law 
Once the rule of law is established, the economic laws should be legislated in 
order to stimulate commerce. These laws should also include open and fair proceedings 
to governmental contracts. Then they will reduce corruption and enhance the virtuous 
cycle of the economy which in turn allows tax collection to pay for other services as well 











IV.  HOW BINDING POWER LEADS TO MISSION SUCCESS IN 
COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTIONS 
A. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS  
Virginia Page Fortna argues that strong peace agreements after inter-state 
conflicts have an effect that leads to longer peace terms.
56
 Likewise, strong UN Security 
Council Resolutions relating to intra-state conflicts increase the durability of peace in 
failing states. We define a strong resolution as one with binding executive power to 
international professionals over the local officials and institutions. In these missions, 
interveners can supervise local authorities, provide mandatory advice on how to fulfill 
tasks, conduct audits and hold them accountable for complying with international norms.  
A weak mandate, on the other hand, only allows the mission to be conducted with a 
“hands-off” approach through observation and reports that merely get filed. This 
cultivates an attitude from the local government of not being required to follow the 
instructions of international interveners.  Since most of the governments of the failing 
states are weak and corrupt, binding power should be granted to the outside actors during 
complex missions. There is a theoretical logic under this approach as well as some 
empirical data for support.  
Theoretically, if the UN sets up a mission in a failing state with a strong mandate, 
all parties involved must accept this unconditionally because international assistance will 
be their only way forward.  Once signed, the tendency to obey the agreement becomes 
accepted with the knowledge that the assistance will stop.  As long as the international 
actors are granted binding power, aid delivery will be fair, effective, and expedient due to 
their competency and professionalism. With binding power, the ability to fill gaps in the 
services will be possible to include the reduction of corruption, the incompetency of local 
government officials and the likelihood of disenfranchised parties resorting to violence. 
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B. EMPIRICAL DATA: MISSIONS WITH AND WITHOUT BINDING 
POWER  
Empirical data supports this thesis on the binding power theory. Successful 
international missions created from UN resolutions with a strong binding power include 
UNMIK, EULEX, KFOR in Kosovo, and UNTAC in Cambodia, United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), and UNOSOM and UNITAF in 
Somalia.  It can be seen that missions without binding power were mostly failures and the 
combating parties resorted to armed conflict several times such as UNOSOM II in 
Somalia, UNMIS in Sudan, and UNFICYP in Cyprus.  Table 2 shows the relationship 
between the binding power and mission success in complex international interventions.  
 
Region Operation Year Binding Power Mission Success 
Cambodia UNTAC 1992–1993 Yes Yes 
Kosovo UNMIK, KFOR 1999- 2008 Yes Yes 
Kosovo EULEX 2008–2011 Yes Yes 
East Timor UNTAET 1999–2002 Yes Yes 
Somalia UNOSOM, UNITAF 1991–1993 Yes Yes 
Somalia UNOSOM II 1993–1995 Yes/No* No 
Sudan UNMIS 2005–2011 No No 
Afghanistan UNAMA 2010–2011 No Yes 
Cyprus UNFICYP 1964–2011 No No 
*UNOSOM II started with a strong mandate but a year later its binding power was 
repealed. 
Table 2.   Relationship between binding power and mission success in international 
interventions.    
1. UNMIK and EULEX in Kosovo 
A clear example to a successful mission with binding power is UNMIK.  UNSC 
Resolution 1244 articles 9, 10, and 11 fortified the mission with the power to deter 
renewed hostilities, enforce a ceasefire, ensure public safety, establish and oversee 
provisional governmental institutions and local police forces, and hold the elections.
57
  
Through this power, it was also possible to successfully resettle refugees and internally 
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displaced persons (IDPs).  Likewise, the accomplishments of EULEX transpired 
through institution building of law enforcement forces and judiciary bodies in Kosovo. It 
also had a strong mandate that allowed the EULEX police forces to raid the residences of 
several high government officials, including a minister accused and later prosecuted for 
taking bribes which ultimately led to their resignation, setting a precedent that no one was 
above the law.  
2. UNTAC in Cambodia 
UNTAC was established by Security Council resolution 745 (1992) and granted 
the right to organize and conduct free and fair elections. In addition to this mandate, the 
restructuring of the military occurred with new laws protecting human rights and the 
resettlement of refugees and IDPs and the repair of the Cambodian infrastructure.  
UNTAC successfully restored the security and order, established a new government, 




3. UNTAET and UNMISET in East Timor 
The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was 
granted a string mandate by UN resolution 1272 in 1999 by exercising administrative 
authority over the country during the transition to independence.  Once order was 
established with a functioning legitimate government; the United Nations Mission of 
Support in East Timor (UNMISET) followed with a mandate to provide assistance to the 
new government until it managed to rule the country self-sufficiently.
59
 
4. UNOSOM and UNITAF in Somalia 
Another successful example of UN intervention was the mission of UNOSOM.  It 
was authorized by UNSC resolution 751 in November 1992 with an expansion to its 
mandate of resolution 794.  The mission was equipped with the statute to use “all 
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necessary means” in order to establish a secure environment for the relief effort and form 
The Unified Task Force (UNITAF). This task force was charged with the protection of 
aid delivery and reestablishment of order and peace. This mission successfully 
accomplished a safe and secure environment for rapid aid delivery by using its binding 
power as well as effectively negotiating with the political factions for an interim 
administration and a period to lay down arms.
60
 However, success would be short-lived 
in this scenario due to the replacement with UNOSOM II. 
5. UNOSOM II in Somalia 
UNOSOM II initially began with a strong mandate and in many ways like the first 
UNOSOM mission. However, due to mistakes such as a rivalry between the international 
actors and the ambitions of Major General William Garrison, and uncoordinated attacks, 
it failed to maintain the success of its predecessor. The mission was authorized for the use 
of force to ensure a stable environment for humanitarian assistance and provide 
assistance to the reconstruction efforts.
61
  However, the UN and U.S. experts lost focus 
from the mandate and embarked upon a man hunting mission to capture or kill the most 
powerful warlord in Somalia, Muhammad Farah Aidid. Aidid’s militia killed 24 Pakistani 
peacekeepers of UNOSOM II. As clashes escalated and increased between UNOSOM 
peacekeepers and Somali militiamen in Mogadishu, so did the casualties among the 
civilians. In October 1993, U.S. Rangers launched an uncoordinated attack on militias 
that resulted in the death of more than 1,000 Somalia civilians, 1,000 militias and 20 
coalition forces (19 from the U.S. and one from Malaysia).   
Protests from home led to a U.S. withdrawal from Somalia and Security Council 
resolution 897 amended the mission mandate excluding the use of binding power. The 
new mandate only authorized advisory tasks and ultimately the entire mission was 
withdrawn without achieving any tangible success.
62
  Reflecting back on this mission, if a 
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strong mandate continued to authorize binding power and not allow the mistake of 
working independently, success would have been the result. 
6. UNMIS in Sudan 
As the list of failures continues, United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 
stands out with a weak mandate that also failed to have binding authority over the local 
actors.  In January 2005, UN resolution 1590 supported the implementation of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement through monitoring, investigating, and assisting with 
other tasks that included demining efforts.   However, the duties and responsibilities were 
not binding and the following programs were held on a voluntary and participatory basis 
only.  These programs included the establishment of a DDR package, public information 
campaign, reconciliation and peace building efforts, restructuring the police service, and 
promoting the rule of law.
63
  UNMIS functioned with no real authority over the local 
parties to enforce recommendations, to hold local institutions accountable for human 
rights violations and the expenses lost from humanitarian aid. This weak approach led to 
the failure of the mission and the recurrence of the conflict between the government and 
SPLA (Sudanese People Liberation Army) several times over. 
7. UNFICYP in Cyprus 
As the downward slope continues, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in 
Cyprus (UNFICYP) demonstrates another failed example due to the lack of binding 
power. Established in 1964, the UN Security Council passed resolution 186 that also had 
a weak mandate, only requiring monitoring and advising duties. The purpose of the 
mandate was to prevent additional clashes between the Greek and Turkish groups, 
supervise ceasefire lines in the buffer zone, and undertake humanitarian activities.  It 
failed to prevent the skirmishes and therefore, in 1974, additional tasks were 
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implemented to the resolution.
64
  Unfortunately, the mission failed due to ethnic 
cleansing of the Turkish minority that resulted in an invasion of the island by Turkish 
Armed Forces. 
8. UNAMA in Afghanistan 
Another mission with a weak mandate is the United Nations Assistance Mission 
in Afghanistan (UNAMA). Established in 2010 by UN Security Council Resolution 1917 
at the request of the Afghanistan Government, UNAMA is mandated to monitor and 
coordinate the efforts to improve security, governance, economic development, and 
regional cooperation.
65
 Since the government was established by international efforts 
through fair elections, it demonstrates being compatible with international standards and 
a willingness to follow advice provided by international actors and therefore has the 
potential of success.  
9. International Assistance Programs in Yemen 
With all the turmoil surrounding Yemen, one may wonder if that regime is the 
next to fall during the movement of the Arab Spring.  There are numerous challenges 
within the country that range from extreme corruption, weak state institutions, depleting 
resources such as oil and water, uncontrolled terrorism, human rights violations and a 
leader that refuses to relinquish power. 
However, there has been no decision by the UN Security Council or NATO to get 
involved with the deteriorating situation in this country.  Many are expecting the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) or perhaps the Arab League to take a more assertive role that 
would possibly reverse the situation.  Several attempts to negotiate an exit strategy by the 
GCC have been disregarded by President Ali Abdullah Saleh, including a clause that 
provided immunity.   
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As for U.S.-Yemen relationships, during the 1990s they were strained after 
President Saleh supported Iraq’s decision to invade Kuwait.  Financial aid became almost 
non-existent during that time and countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait expunged the 
Yemen workers in their country that further strained the Yemen economy.  However, 
since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have focused on terrorism and al-Qaeda, President 
Saleh has attempted to be more cooperative with the west in its war on terror.  In recent 
years, the Defense Department has used Section 1206 (a security assistance program) to 
train and equip Yemen. This fund has become the major source of U.S. military aid to 
counter-terrorism counter-insurgency (COIN) operations.   
The west continues to push the neighbors of Yemen to be more active; however, 
many of the Gulf countries lack the human expertise or even the desire to begin aid 
projects in Yemen.  Jeremy Sharp states that the preferred route is to donate cash to 
Yemen or outsource development work to Western aid agencies.66   Furthermore, there is 
not one single aid office in Sana’a to represent any states from the GCC.  Despite the 
Yemeni willingness to receive on-the-ground Arab support, there has been little headway 
with only a handful of Saudi and Egyptian experts to provide economic advice.67   
The society of Yemen is fractured and the lack of skilled workers is detrimental to 
the overall economy, continuing to cripple the country.68 Saudi Arabia and others have 
launched a number of training programs in recent years, including the financing of 
technical-training institutes.  However, external aid in both financial and political arenas 
is required to improve Yemen’s ability to provide security, economic reform and 
governance.  Until the situation improves, donors will continue to be hesitant with the 
expectation of the aid being squandered. 
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C. CASE STUDIES 
1. Kosovo 
a. Introduction  
This case study highlights the international intervention in Kosovo as a 
legitimate success for the post-Cold War era of international interventions into failing 
states. The international intervention managed to stop bloodshed, rapidly restored law 
and order, delivered humanitarian aid to the people in need, and ran elections to establish 
a new administration. The key ingredient for success was the binding power of the 
international interveners over local government.  This case study will analyze how the 
binding power of the international interveners increased success through the four pillars 
of post-conflict reconstruction.  
To put this case in perspective, it will be necessary to go back several 
decades during the disintegration of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between 
1991 and 1999.  At the onset of the conflict, Kosovo was a province of the Serbian 
dominated former Yugoslavia Federation, with Albanians holding 80% of the majority 
within the province.
69
  A conflict between the rebels of Muslim Albanians and 
Yugoslavian security forces of Serbian origin escalated into a civil war.  A RAND report 
illustrates that Yugoslav counterinsurgency (COIN) forces waged an ethnic cleansing 
campaign against Albanian Kosovars during the initial phase of the insurgency.  By the 




The healing process worked through the provision of numerous areas, but 
primarily with a focus on humanitarian aid combined with development goals and 
eventually transferring the responsibilities to the new local government.  The mission 
started with a military operation and the delivery of aid and continued with other 
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medium- and long-term reconstruction projects.  Within the economy, numerous 
problems remain; however, much has been done in all four pillars of the post-conflict 
reconstruction.  
The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) governed the country, 
established a legitimate parallel provisional government and supervised it while gradually 
passing over the responsibilities to rule the province.  On February 17, 2008, the 
provisional assembly of Kosovo declared its independence and was recognized by 
seventy-five states.  Currently, the government of Kosovo is functioning while 
simultaneously receiving international assistance.  The situation is gradually improving 
and the nation is currently enjoying peace in an effort to place the atrocities of the civil 
war behind them.   
b. Historical and Cultural Issues: Prolonged Hatred 
Kosovo has been very important to both Albanians and Serbs alike.  
Albanians believe that they are descendants of Illyrians, the original residents of Kosovo.  
However, the Serbs reject this idea on the grounds that Albanians were brought in by the 
Turks during the Ottoman invasion.   
The Serbs endured much suffering because of their choice to keep their 
religion; however, the Albanians converted to Islam, which brought them more wealth 
during Ottoman rule.  As the Ottoman Empire began to decline, Serbs revolted in 1817 
and by 1867, eventually establishing their independence.  During the Balkan War in 
1912–1913, younger Albanians fought with the Ottomans against the Serbs, and in turn 
the Serbian inhabitants burned Albanian villages and killed many Albanians and Turks in 
their wake.
71
   
Yugoslavia applied an oppressive policy on Albanians and ran a 
settlement program that confiscated the land of Albanians and granted them to Serbian 
settlers who were brought into the area from Serbia and forced Albanians to immigrate to 
Turkey. The situation changed after the death of Tito in the early 1980s with a reverse 
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migration: Serbians from Kosovo and Albanians back into Kosovo.  Demanding 
autonomy, Albanian riots began in 1981; Serbians were beaten and their homes burned 
and looted.  The response was severe; the regime sent in 30,000 troops armed with tanks 
that killed more than a 1,000 Albanians.
72
   
c. International Intervention 
As the conflict intensified, the UN imposed diplomatic sanctions, 
including economic and arms embargo, on Yugoslavia in an effort to work a peaceful 
negotiation.
73
  At the end of May 1998, NATO promulgated the “Declaration on Kosovo” 
and flew 85 aircrafts sorties over Albania and Macedonia in “Operation Determined 
Falcon.” On January 29, 1999, the contact group gave an ultimatum to Serbs and 
Albanians to attend peace negotiations in Rambouillet, France.  The international 
community expected to find a solution within the territorial unity of Yugoslavia that 
included an immediate ceasefire, discontinuation of human right abuses, establishment of 
substantial autonomy of Kosovo under Yugoslavia, and a solution to administrative 
issues under international supervision.
74
 When negotiations in Paris failed for a second 
time in March 1999, the order was given to launch “Operation Allied Force” with air 
attacks on strategic Serbian targets.
75
  Milosevic surrendered on June 10, 1999 and 
announced that he would accept NATO’S conditions as well as UN Resolution 1244.76   
In line with the resolution, NATO established KFOR and Russia deployed 
troops to assist NATO and began providing security. The UN established UNMIK and 
began to rule the province with a superior authority in means of administrative, 
legislative, and judiciary actions. Elections were held in 2000 and 2001 at the local and 
national level respectively, with UNMIK establishing legitimate institutions at all levels 
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and began a transfer of tasks to local authorities.  However, UNMIK continued to retain 
their power and leading positions at all levels of administration.
77
  The elections were 
seen as free and fair and security was also well provided by CIVPOL and KFOR.
78
  The 
interim government managed to execute the next local elections in 2002 and national 
elections in 2004.  In both instances, the transfer of power was done peacefully. 
On March 17, 2004, after five years under UN rule, severe Albanian 
demonstrations started in Kosovo.  Albanians rioted when Serbian hooligans chased three 
Albanians into the Ibor River and they drowned.  The riots lasted more than 48 hours and 
international security forces were not successful enough to quell the revolts, despite local 
police, CIVPOL, and KFOR all working together.
79
  With increased pressure from the 
international community and criticism in the media, Special Envoy of Secretary General 
Martti Ahtisaari suggested an internationally-supervised independence for Kosovo.  
Ahtisaari’s proposal was supported by the U.S. and EU, but harshly opposed by Serbia 
and Russia.  On February 18, 2008, the assembly of Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of 
Self Government declared its independence.    
d. Analysis: Through the Four Pillars 
The most significant feature of the Kosovo operation was its resoluteness 
from the beginning; the UN and NATO warned Serbia, imposed sanctions, bombarded, 
dismissed Serbian militias and security forces, and ran the country with full binding 
power.  Conflicts stopped, a safe and secure environment was obtained, refugees and 
IDPs were resettled, international aid was delivered, new functioning institutions were 
constructed, infrastructure was restored, development projects were launched, and 
participation of local people was enabled.  This part of the chapter analyzes the 
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international intervention in Kosovo in light of Orr’s four pillars of stabilization and 
reconstruction.
80
    
(1) 1
st
 Pillar: Safe and Secure Environment. Security was 
initially provided by NATO’s KFOR that was later accompanied by UNMIK’s civilian 
police forces (CIVPOL) which performed law enforcement tasks until it was replaced by 
the European Union’s rule of law mission EULEX in 2008.  KFOR soldiers and UN 
police (CIVPOL) guided the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) to reduce serious crime rates. 
KFOR, CIVPOL, and EULEX were all equipped with a binding administrative power 
over local police and executive power over the population and other institutions. As 
Wittmann maintains, international forces were successful in protecting minorities: “… 
had there been no international intervention, there would have been much more atrocities.  
Not to mention, there would be no neutral security forces to stop ethnic cleansing, 
because they would have been part of it.”81  
In 2009, the Kosovo Protection Forces were dissolved and Kosovo 
Security Forces (KSF) was founded as a civilian controlled military force and UNMIK 
civilian police handed over its tasks to Kosovo Police Service (KPS). Since then, the 
European Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) has supported and trained local officials to 
develop an EU standard professional police and judiciary.
82
  The Kosovo Police Service 
has managed to provide security during five elections and continues to strive for 
European standards of security and law enforcement tasks.
83
 The overall security 
situation has been calm as of May 2011, with increased participation of Serbs and other 
minorities within Kosovo institutions.
84
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UNMIK ran a successful DDR program and managed to 
reintegrate ex-combatants into social life. Members of KLA were successfully 
demobilized, reintegrated into society and recruited into the newly founded Kosovo 
Protection Corps (KPC).
85
 The KPC later became the Kosovo Security Forces (KSF) 
responsible to civilian administration. 
(2)  2nd Pillar: Governance and Participation. This pillar was 
the most successful pillar of international intervention in Kosovo. UNMIK and KFOR 
had enough of a degree of legal authority, economic power, and manpower to take 
necessary actions effectively. Using these instruments, they restored order, provided 
necessary services for the population, established a new government, and gradually 
transferred authority to this democratically elected government. Under UN supervision, 
Kosovo has progressed through the years and developed a multi-party democratic system 
that reached the “European proximity process.”86   
At the outset, UNMIK simultaneously performed its peacekeeping 
tasks and ruled Kosovo like a government. The head of UNMIK, the SRSG was the head 
of the government retaining the highest degree of legislative, judiciary and administrative 
power. UNMIK established a local interim government called Joint Interim 
Administrative Structures (JIAS) in 1999 (also called Provisional Institutions of Self-
Governance, PISG).  The Joint Advisory Council on Legislative Matters (JAC) was 
founded as a consultative branch to review and comment on drafts of regulations.  The 
council was comprised of twenty local and seven international legal advisers.
87
     
JIAS was designed to function under the authority of SRSG, until 
it would gain enough degree of experience at national and municipal levels.  The 
participation of the minorities was also accomplished with the exception of some Serbs in 
Mitrovica.   
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UNMIK ran elections in 2000 and 2001 at the local and national 
level respectively and handed over some parts of the administration to JIAS.  Although 
there were some logistical matters and a boycott by ethnic Serbs, the elections were seen 
as free and fair by the international media.  CIVPOL and KFOR were successful at 
providing security with no major incidents during the elections.    
The 2001 government was led by the LDK (Democratic League of 
Kosovo) and was comprised of two leading parties: PDK (Democratic Party of Kosovo) 
and AAK (Alliance for the Future of Kosovo). Serbs and other minority groups were 
included by granting a ministry for each in the government.   The minorities were also 
granted the right to hold 20 seats in the 120-seat assembly.  Local institutions such as the 
Kosovo Police Service (KPS) and the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) embraced 
minorities; 10% of the KPS is comprised of Kosovo Serbs, and the proportional of 
minorities in senior levels reaches 20%, significantly more than their share of the 
population.
88
  JIAS was capable enough to facilitate the subsequent two elections: local 
elections in 2002 and national elections in 2004.  During both instances, the transfer of 
power was done peacefully.   
Standards before the status policy of the UN created an uncertainty 
for the future of the province.   While Albanians pressed for independence, the Serbs in 
the North established parallel government institutions to undermine the local government 
as well as development projects. Serchuk exemplifies this phenomenon:  
Serbia effectively controlled the four municipalities in the northwestern 
corner of Kosovo, north of the Ibor River, which bisects Mitrovica.  In the 
northern half of the city, Serbian police and government structures 
operated.  Traveling on a public bus from Mitrovica to Belgrade, one 
encounters no border or passport controls.89   
Belgrade persistently maintained its strategy on preventing Kosovar Serbs from 
participating in Kosovo’s institutions, because it could mean recognizing the 
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independence of Kosovo.  Some elite Kosovar Serbs wanted to participate in the elections 
of 2004, but they were prevented from doing so by Belgrade. 
When Kosovo declared its independence, the Serb minority was 
still under the influence of Belgrade and parallel organizations, particularly in the 
northern municipalities.  Ethnic Serbs in the region constituted 40% of the overall Serb 
population in Kosovo.  However, the situation got better by the end of 2009; their safety, 
security and freedom of movement were increased and their relations with Albanian 
neighbors were also recovered. They participated in local elections for a stake in their 
municipalities through the decentralization process of Kosovo. The participation in 
elections was higher than the participation in the elections ran by Serbian government in 
May 2008 for parallel structures
 90
  The Kosovo municipalities began increasing their 
legitimacy gradually, and got better by the increased participation of Serb minority with 
the awareness that the parallel structures could not give what legal Kosovo administration 
gave: development.  In February 2010, with the help of EULEX, the government adopted 
a strategic program on the integration of north Kosovo.   
Corruption has always been a problem in Kosovo; however, after 
2008 it became increasingly apparent.  This led to a decrease of public support behind the 
government.  As Ilir maintains, the ad hoc companies established by senior governmental 
officers, their relatives or contacts spread rapidly throughout the country and began to 
win the governmental tenders.  This also led to a drastic decrease in foreign investments.  
Displeasure was prominent among the civil society, media and NGOs.  To silence 
criticisms the government adopted a repressive policy over the media and constrained the 
freedom of speech.
91
   To solve these problems EULEX started its fight on corruption. On 
April 28, 2010 EULEX police raided the house and office of the Kosovar minister of 
transportation, post, and telecommunications and EULEX announced that it would 
continue its operations on more ministries and institutions. 
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 Pillar: Social and Economic Wellbeing.  Within the 
first days of the intervention, UNMIK started reconstruction activities by restoring water, 
electricity, and heating networks, while KFOR military engineers repaired the railway 
network and repaired 200 km of roads.  The UN provided basic services to the population 
and launched a reconstruction program to repair destroyed houses and infrastructure. 
Likewise, numerous reconstruction projects were carried out by NGOs. The intervention 
also led to high-salary job opportunities for the young unemployed people, albeit 
temporarily.  
Despite continuous efforts of the international actors, the economy 
has been the weakest link in the chain.  First Standards before Status Policy had some 
unwanted outcomes over the war-torn economy.  International capital investors hesitated 
to sink money into Kosovo due to some concerns about the future of their investment.  
On the other hand, lacking the status of a state, Kosovo’s administration had some 
difficulties in finding loans in the international market, which they desperately needed to 
reconstruct their war-torn infrastructure. Instead, the international community elected to 
provide aid to Kosovo, resulting in an economy that was dependent on outside assistance. 
Widespread corruption in governmental institutions led to a drastic 
decrease in local and international investments in the economy. Displeasure remained 
high among the civil society, media and NGOs. Historically there had always been 
complaints about corruption, but after 2008 it became even more apparent.  As mentioned 
in the second pillar, the operations of EULEX raised hope for abolishing corruption.     
Nevertheless, the accomplishments in these areas cannot be 
degraded for a war-torn area. The numbers below provide some insight about the 
economics and social situation in Kosovo.
92
  In 2005, half of the 2 million Kosovars were 
poor with 15% living in extreme poverty.
93
 Some other statistics are as follows: 
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 Health (2003 est.):  
o Infant mortality rate: 23.7/1,000.  
o Life expectancy: 75 Years.   
 Education rates (2007 est.):  
o 91.9% (men 96.6%, women 87.5%). 
o School enrollment rates of children 7–15 ages (2003 
est.):  96%.   
 GDP (IMF 2010 Estimate):  
o $5.4 Million.  
o per capita $2.750.  
o GDP Growth Rate: 3.5%.  
o Investment: 35% of GDP.  
 Unemployment: 45% of labor force is unemployed.  
 30% of the citizens live below the poverty line.  
 13% live in extreme poverty.94 
(4)  4
th
 Pillar: Justice and Reconciliation.  Following UNTAC, 
UNMIK provided a second example of an international mission to hold a comprehensive 
power not only in executive administration issues, but also full legislative power.  The 
local court and justice system was reconstructed and consolidated by UNMIK in the 
initial phases of the mission.  Their buildings were reconstructed, personnel trained, and 
assistance provided by CIVPOL and KPC.  After 2008, EULEX provided additional 
support to the local justice system with over fifty judges and prosecutors.  Currently, 
Kosovo has a functioning and reliable justice system.  
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In the initial phase of the intervention, more than half of the houses 
were destroyed, tens of thousands of people were homeless, and the returnees could not 
move into their houses because they were occupied by others.
95
  The allegations on 
ownership of property was a complicated issue because the Serbian government had 
previously confiscated most of the houses from Albanian owners and handed them to 
Serbs, and most of these Serbs left the country for Serbia selling those properties to 
Albanians.  These transactions were illegal according to previous law enacted by the 
Serbian government in the early 1990s that prohibited the sale of property to Albanians.  
Some of the deeds were also lost during the conflict.  Making the situation even more 
dire, the justice and court system of the region were mostly underdeveloped and had 
broken down, and was therefore too incompetent to solve these problems.  
The UN initially facilitated the return of hundreds of thousands of 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) back to Kosovo and coordinated a 
massive reconstruction program to repair damaged and destroyed housing and 
infrastructure.  In November 1999, UNMIK established the House and Property 
Directorate and Claims Commission (HPD/CC) to solve the problem on four basic 
principles: to give the right to the returnees to move into their former legally owned 
houses, to give the houses to the owner who lost them due to the discriminatory law, to 
grant legality to the sales of property to Albanians by Serbs, and to maintain validity of 
possessions of property if owned legitimately according to law at the time of 
acquisition.
96
   Until the first decision of the HPD/CC in January 2001, the multi-ethnic 
judicial system, which was established by UNMIK, was also available to help and 
coordinate with HPD/CC.  Several workshops were also organized by UNMIK, OSCE, 
and HPD/CC itself to increase public awareness on the matter.  To implement the 
cadaster reform and property registration system, UNMIK established the Kosovo 
Cadastral Agency (KCA) in June 2001.  
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In contrast with the successful intervention in Kosovo, Somalia resulted in 
absolute failure, despite the first UN mission UNOSOM and UNITAF achieved rapid 
success at the onset.  International officials failed to maintain this successful mission, 
establish a new government, and gain popular support from local population. The 
intervention first started as humanitarian aid by NGOs, and UN institutions and 
international troops were sent when the deteriorated security situation hindered aid 
delivery. International officials decided to disarm warlords and eventually shifted their 
focus to an ambitious man-hunting mission.  They thought that Muhammad Aidid, one of 
the most powerful warlords, was the main hindrance over the stabilization of the country 
and they tried to capture and kill him. The cost of the conflict was too high: almost sixty 
peacekeepers were killed, one hundred injured, hundreds of militia and approximately 
one-thousand civilians were killed. The U.S. and UN withdrew from Somalia leaving the 
people to their own fate. Since then, security and aid delivery, the two most important 
tasks of the initial phase, could not be achieved, and therefore the other pillars of 
reconstruction could not be completed.  
This case study analyzes the international interventions in Somalia since 
1992 which include the following: United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM); 
U.S.-led UN (Mission UNOSOM II, IGAD’s International Governmental Association for 
Development) efforts to establish a government in 2000 and 2004, and African Union 
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).  It examines the programs and policies of these 
operations, evaluates their impacts, and puts forth some policy recommendations for 
future cases. Because the international community left the country in 1995without 
solving the problems, and the problems had not been resolved until present day, the 
Somalia case will be viewed as an example of failure. It starts with background 
information about the Somalia history and culture, continues with the collapse of the 
government, the anarchic environment, international intervention, and the current 
situation. Finally, it analyzes how a lack of binding power of international interveners 
affected the success of the four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction. 
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b. Historical Cultural Issues: Tribal Culture and Gun Culture     
The main cause of the conflict in this country was clannish, not 
territorial.
97
  Since the Middle Ages, tribalism made people conflict-prone, divided 
society into rival and hostile groups, and caused xenophobia. Built upon tribal structures 
with the boundaries drawn by blood lineages, the tribal culture was controversial. What is 
worse, during the colonization years, the British and Italian colonizers drew artificial 
boundaries between tribes that first led to confusion and later to enmity, thus resulting in 
a confrontation amongst the clans.
98
  
Somalia is comprised of two main clans: Sab and Samale. The Sab clan 
includes two clan-families who live in the agricultural areas of the south: Digil and 
Rahanweyn. The Samale clan is made up of four clan families: Darod, Hawiye, Isaq, and 
Dir, and mostly inhabit the North. The Sab clans are mostly sedentary farmers and the 
Samales are mostly nomadic pastorals. Although not all these clans are located in distinct 
territorial areas, almost all of them have their exclusive homelands.  Though the majority 
of the Samale clan occupies the North, they are also present in the South.  Likewise, the 
Sab clans predominantly occupy the South, but are found in the North as well.  Some of 
the Darod and Hawiye families of Samale clan live in the South. Among those is General 
Aideed’s Hawiye clan,99 dominating the regions in and around the capital of Mogadishu.   
The clans are divided into sub-clans and compensation paying groups. If a 
person happens to be killed or injured, a compensation called “diya” must be paid to his 
family and diya-paying group by the offender and/or his diya-paying group. A diya-
paying group can be made up of a few hundred or up to a thousand members. 
Traditionally, security of an individual depends on his membership in his diya-paying 
group, and therefore loyalty of a Somali starts with his loyalty to this group, and 
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continues with loyalty to his clan and clan-family. In addition, some families are able to 
act as a political unit and at the same time as a diya paying group. Ultimately, as the 
physical and political backgrounds are insecure and unstable, the clan network looks 
indispensable for an individual in Somali.  
Firearms were first introduced into Somalia by imports and trafficking 
from Arab countries and during the Cold War from Soviet states. The culture was badly 
affected and inter-clan conflicts increased both in number and in severity. The value 
attributed to a gun has escalated, such that guns have even been presented as dowry. If 
someone has been killed, the first question asked by his clan members is if his gun was 
lost or not. Likewise, the gun that fired t the fatal shot is required from the perpetrator as 
diya, and if it is not submitted could cause a war between the tribes.  
(1) Democracy and Independence.  In 1960 the Republic of 
Somalia declared independence with unification of Italian UN trustee territory of Somalia 
and British protectorate of Somaliland.
100
  The biggest pro-independence group, Somalia 
Youth League (SYL), established their democratic and nationalist government. The first 
democratically elected president, Aden Abdullah Osman Daar, and his new government 
believed that the tribal culture was a hindrance to the development of the country and 
took on a national solidarity program to annihilate tribal ethos. However, due to prevalent 
corruption and different understandings between populations of former Italian and British 
colonial territories, the new democracy couldn’t achieve its goals and eventually turned 
into a one party regime. During the two-year term of the latest government (1967 through 
1969), the country suffered from poor administration, lack of services, insecurity, 
corruption, and violence. The President was killed and a coup d’état deposed the 
government on October 21, 1969. The new regime was a military dictatorship led by 
General Siad Barre who ran the country cruelly until he was removed from power by 
tribal warlords’ in1991. 
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The Barre regime centralized all political power and set out utopic 
objectives like reclaiming lost territories and compiling all Somalis in Kenya, Djibouti, 
and Ethiopia under the flag of great Somalia. In 1977 Somalia troops invaded Ethiopia to 
regain their beloved Ogaden region,
101
 but the government started to weaken after being 
defeated by Ethiopia, and as the Soviet Union disintegrated, the aid was cut at once.
102
 
The bankrupt government weakened and gradually lost administrative control. This 
failure triggered chaos; conflicts started among the ethnic and social factions. In a very 
short time the government became incapable of providing security, basic services and law 
enforcement.       
During the fall of the government, two major resistance 
organizations had taken up arms in Somalia against the regime: the Somali National 
Movement (SNM) of the Issaq clan-family, and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) of 
the Darod Family (mostly Ogaden clan of Barre’s mother’s family).103 Later they were 
accompanied by the United Somali Congress (USC) of a most important warlord, 
Muhammad Farah Aideed. SNM and the USC started attacks on government forces.  
USC forces proceeded through the capital, Mogadishu. The weak government promised 
to take on reforms and offered negotiations in Egypt, but ultimately couldn’t stop the 
rebels who wanted Siad Barre to leave rule and the country in May 1992.  
(2) Escalation of the Conflict.  In January 1991, Muhammad 
Aideed and his rebels defeated the government forces. His faction, United Somalia 
Congress (USC), played an enormous role in overthrowing Barre regime and therefore 
claimed the right to rule the country. Other fighting factions SNM (Somalia National 
Movement) of the Issaq clan-family and SPM (Somalia Patriotic Movement) of the Dir 
clan-family did not conform to the leadership of Aideed. Thus, these three major factions 
started fighting each other for the power to rule the country.
104
     Farming areas were 
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devastated and livestock production was halted, ultimately resulting in famine,
105
  




Later, an internal fight started within the Hawiye clan. During the 
fall of the Barre regime, while Aideed and other insurgents were pursuing the remnants 
of the regime, Ali Mahdi was declared President of Somalia by politicians in Mogadishu 
and the Hawiye dominated diaspora. Although Mahdi was a businessman from the 
Hawiye clan-family, Aideed severely rejected his presidency. The USC was split into two 
groups: SNA (Somalia National Alliance) led by Aideed and SSA (Somalia Salvation 
Alliance) led by Mahdi.  
The tribal fights later took the shape of warlordism. The warlords 
initially sought the interests of their clans and later sought personal, political and 
economic gains. They increased their power but diminished the infrastructure by 
hoarding the fortunes for themselves. They also frustrated the efforts of the UN and other 
international actors to provide humanitarian aid and to stabilize the country. After 2006 
warlords began losing power against Islamic movements, particularly the Union of 
Islamic Courts (UIC).  
c. International Intervention 
International intervention started with humanitarian aid in 1990. When the 
conflicts halted aid delivery, the United States launched a military intervention in 1992 to 
help the people suffering from poverty, malnutrition, rapes and other crimes.
107
 U.S. 
forces were later joined by UN peacekeepers, which together made up UNOSOM. They 
had enough manpower and a strong mandate which helped them reach rapid success. 
However, they were replaced with UNOSOM II and the operation executed by Task 
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Force Ranger in October 1993 resulted in failure caused by undesirable confrontations of 
peacekeepers with the armed groups, resulting in casualties from both sides as well as 
innocent civilians.  
After the failure, the U.S. left the country in March 1994, followed by the 
UN in March 1995. Other international actors, like NGOs and regional organizations, 
tried to maintain international aid. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), a regional East African organization, managed to establish Transitional National 
Government (TNG) in 2000 with a three-year mandate. After the failure of the TNG in 
three years, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was established with a five-year 
mandate.  The TFG was antagonized by insurgents. In 2006 Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 
support of the TFG, and the African union (AU) established its mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM). The U.S. and UN backed these efforts with funds but could not change the 
tragic situation in the country. 
Local warlords and clan leaders refused to yield to a nationwide 
administration and rejected the attempts of the international community to establish a 
legitimate government. Interested in their ambitious personal and grassroots level 
interests, they continued fighting each other as well as the new government.
108
 By 2006, 
Fundamental Islamism entered the scene and defeated most of the warlords in south-
central Somalia. The UIC rapidly increased its power with support from the population. 
The UIC managed to provide some services, rule of law, and security to an extent, but 
assumed a hostile approach against international actors and the TFG established by 
internationals. Likewise, the international community had numerous doubts about the 
UIC’s fundamentalist Islamist agenda. In 2011, the TFG was still unable to function 
properly and continued to suffer antagonism both from Islamists and tribal warlords, 
while the masses continued suffering from statelessness, starvation, insecurity, and 
natural disasters. 
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(1) The Initial UN Intervention, UNOSOM.  Under Chapter 7 
of the UN charter, which issued militarily interventions and the use of force for 
international peace on April 24, 1992, the UN Security Council declared Resolution 751 
to establish its mission UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia) to provide 
security for aid delivery to the starving people. The resolution required 50 unarmed 
ceasefire observers and 500 peacekeepers.
109
 Somalis happily welcomed UN forces as 
saviors from starvation, violence and disease, but warlords saw the UN as an impediment 
to their competition for control over the country.
110
  In Operation Provide Relief, U.S. 
troops achieved rapid success in providing security for aid delivery while USAID 
provided 145,000 tons of food.
111
  U.S. military cooperated with international NGOs and 
the International Red Cross. Although their standpoint as military officers and NGO 
members differed from each other, the sensible plan of the commander of the Operation 
Provide Relief, General Libutti, allowed them to work in unison. He made his officers 
adapt to the conditions of the NGOs and assisted with their aid delivery activities.
112
  Aid 
stuff was loaded and unloaded by NGOs on military aircrafts operated by unarmed 
military personnel to food storages and temporary kitchens. NGOs ran these kitchens and 
hired some local workers, paying them food and money. They mostly delivered the aid 
stuff dropping from air to avoid the banditry on the roads and a potential armed conflict 
with factions. General Libutti also established a good relationship with the local powerful 
people of Somalia including governmental officers and even some warlords. All these 
good relationships with the actors involved significantly increased the success of the 
mission and kept the air workers safe.   
As required by UN Resolution 794, Operation Restore Hope began 
on December 7, 1992 with 29,000 U.S. troops while the rest of the coalition sent 10,000 
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to constitute the United Task Force (UNITAF).
113
 There was a significant difference 
between the understandings of UN officials of UNOSOM and U.S. officials of UNITAF. 
UN officials were defining the problem and the mission more broadly. They wanted to 
make sure that the mission would succeed and prevent future repetition of the same 
problems in the country insisting on more aggressive disarmament of Somalis 
warlords.
114
 The UNITAF forces on the other hand favored a softer approach: voluntarily 
disarmament of the warlords. Eventually the U.S. and coalition forces complied with 
UNOSOM demands and started an aggressive disarmament plan. They started to search 
areas and buildings of the warlords including Aideed for arms and heavy weapons.
115
 
However, UNITAF successfully maintained its core operations of providing security, 
assisting aid delivery, and imposing a ceasefire.  Another area UNITAF wisely handled 
was information operations with 150 personnel for communicating the coalition 
perspective throughout the nation, a radio and one daily newspaper broadcasting in the 
local language. However, UNITAF was replaced with UNOSOM II in May 1993. 
(2) The Follow-On U.S.-led UN Force, UNOSOM II.  The UN 
follow-on mission of UNOSOM II was the culmination of international efforts under the 
UN umbrella with a bigger mandate: to restore order, disarm the warlords, provide peace, 
repair the economy, and reconcile the conflicting parties. Total numbers of the personnel 
reached 30,000, with 6,000 U.S. personnel for logistic assistance and a small, quick 
reaction force.
116
 Despite the big mandate it had weaker operational capabilities than 
UNITAF.
117
 Not enough attention was paid to informational operations; the number of 
staff working in this area was merely six people. 
The activities of UNOSOM II threatened the strongest warlord, 
Muhammad Farah Aideed. UNOSOM II held a series of meetings in Addis Ababa, 
acknowledging power of the warlords but also limiting it through the formation of district 
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councils. Moreover, at these meetings Aideed’s rival, Ali Mahdi, polled more votes than 
Aideed. In response, Aideed mounted a hostile public relations campaign against 
UNOSOM through a radio station under his control. But the UN was equipped to counter 
his campaign, because its 6-man information unit failed to communicate its case to the 
Somali people.
118
 To present a show of force and establish authority, the UN decided to 
inspect all the arms depots of the warlords. It conducted the first inspection in Mogadishu 
in five arms depots belonging to Aideed and the site of Aideed’s radio station. Aideed’s 
militias suddenly provoked the crowd against UN forces, saying that fellow Muslim 
Pakistani soldiers were being used against Somalis. While the crowd attacked Pakistani 
peacekeepers, armed militias infiltrated the crowd and killed 24 Pakistanis and wounded 
57 others.  
After this incident the U.S. and the UN decided to capture Aided, 
removing him from Somalia’s political life. They declared him an outlaw and put a 
$25,000 bounty on him. Later, UN officials started to refer to him as a terrorist, closing 
the means of negotiations with Aideed, although he was not totally closed for talks. The 
quick reaction force of the U.S. attacked with helicopters and killed thirty senior leaders 
of the Aideed faction SNA. Aideed shifted to hit and run tactics, killing four Italian 
peacekeepers in an ambush and four American soldiers with a command detonated 
landmine. This led to the decision of sending U.S. Special Operations Task Force 
Rangers to Somalia, which Aideed welcomed with mortar attacks injuring soldiers. A 
U.S. helicopter was also shot down killing three soldiers. 
On October 3, 1993, the Rangers launched a massive helicopter 
attack on Aideed’s places in Bakara Market Area and Mogadishu. 1,000 militia were 
killed, 1,500 wounded, and 21 captured while 20 coalition forces were killed (19 from the 
U.S. and one from Malaysia), and 73 Americans and two Pakistanis were wounded. One 
American soldier was also captured. The collateral damage was enormous: allegedly 
more than 1,000 civilians were killed. This event entailed the American decision to 
withdraw from Somalia. Aideed resumed his mortar attacks in the three days until the UN 
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called for ceasefire. The U.S. withdrew from Somalia by March 1994, followed by the 
UN in March 1995. Since the withdrawals, the situation has greatly deteriorated. 
After leaving the country, the UN decided to run its Somalia 
related operations from Nairobi, Kenya due to insecure working environments in 
Somalia.  The UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) was established on April 15, 
1995.
119
  Failing to physically exist in Somalia, UNPOS has been far from achieving its 
goals. It has been content with supporting the efforts by East African nation to promote 
peace and national reconciliation in Somalia.
120
 It supported efforts by Djibouti on the 
establishment of a Temporary National Government (TNG) and IGAD’s (Inter-
Governmental Association for Development in East Africa) efforts to establish 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004.  It continues to support TFG from 
Nairobi today.   
(3) International Efforts to Establish a Government. Since 
1991, the international community ran 15 reconciliation conferences to end the conflicts 
and reestablish a government.
121
 Although some accomplishments were acquired, none of 
these reconciliation efforts succeeded. In May 2000 at a reconciliation conference in 
Djibouti, the Transitional National Government (TNG) was founded. The President of 
Somalia, Abdiquassim Salad Hassan, and his new cabinet were not successful in 
establishing institutions throughout the country, but only in some parts of Mogadishu. 
Their authority was not widely accepted throughout the nation. A severe opposition 
started immediately and continuedto mount, making the TNG unable to rule 
effectively.
122
 It couldn’t provide services and suffered from corrupt bureaucrats. “TNG’s 
3-year mandate was expired with a bankruptcy in December 2003.”123   
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Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional east 
African organization launched another national reconciliation conference 
in Kenya in 2002. In 2004 the conference managed to form the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG): Abdullah Yusuf Ahmad was 
elected as president and Ali Mohammed Gedi as prime minister with 5 
years mandate. The duties were; to lead the political transition of the 
country, draft a new constitution, run a referendum for the approval of the 
constitution, and lead elections in 2009 to establish a permanent 
government and a parliament.
124
 
Until 2005, the government was located in Kenya due to security 
concerns when it made the move into Somalia.  They did not relocate to Mogadishu; first 
they moved to Jowhar, and later to Baidoa. Through the course of time, the tribal-based 
conflict shifted to warlordism, producing strong guerrilla leaders. When the international 
community tried to establish a national level government, these warlords defied them 
because they did not want to yield to the government. At this phase Islam entered to the 
scene; Islamic militias who were previously defeated by clan-based militias adopted a 
strategy to develop a grassroots movement, increased their power in time and reentered 
the political life. For a long time they integrated themselves into the local communities, 
businesses, schools, courts, and other key sectors, avoiding direct involvement in political 
struggle, until they grew strong enough. These Islamic groups merged together and 
established the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in 2006. The increase in power of the UIC 
threatened the warlords, prompting them to merge together, thus founding the Alliance 
against Terrorism and Restoration of Peace (AATRP).
125
 They attacked the UIC but were 
severely defeated and driven out of Mogadishu.
126
 Winning the war against warlords, the 
UIC spread throughout south-central Somalia and wiped out the rest of the warlords. It 
challenged the TFG by transforming the order into a sharia law, according to an 
interpretation of Islam akin to Taliban. 
The U.S. and the Western countries became concerned with the 
growing relationships between al Qaida and the UIC. Therefore, as Cuevas and Wells 
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express, “the U.S. turned a blind eye to invasion Somalia by Ethiopia in 2006.”127 The 
Ethiopian invasion aimed to bolster the secular minded TFG
128
 and launch some peace 
enforcement-like maneuvers.
129
 The extremists who wanted to establish a fundamental 
Islamic government managed to make use of the Ethiopian invasion for their own 
propaganda. In 2007 most of the country was taken under control by Shabab (MYM),
130
 
the armed wing of the UIC. Struggling with its own problems, the TFG was unable to 
counter the challenges of the UIC.  
(4) AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) and Current 
Situation.  In March 2007, the African Union authorized the AMISOM (African Union 
Mission in Somalia) to stabilize the country and support the transitional government 
against insurgencies. The mission failed to achieve its goals and dreadful living 
conditions continued in Somalia. The armed insurgencies against the TFG and Ethiopian 
forces continued. The situation worsened with the effects of drought and floods in 2007, 




When Ethiopia withdrew in January 2009, Shabab took advantage 
of the power vacuum. By February 2009, the group controlled almost all of southern 
Somalia.
132
 The U.S. declared Shabab a terrorist organization and bombed targets in 
Mogadishu, resulting in severe collateral damage. As with the Ethiopian invasion, 
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American bombings did not result in stability; on the contrary, they strengthened the 
violence-prone Somalis and weakened the moderates.
133
 
According to a report in The Economist, the situation was dreadful 
in Somalia:  
The 3.2 million people out of 8 million Somalis were in need of aid just in 
order to survive. A sixth of the infants are at risk of starving to death.  The 
security situation was intolerable and therefore the aid workers left the 
country. Piracy remained unsolved and even worsened offshore.
134
   
In 2011, during the days that this chapter was written in, the bad 
effects of the drought were coupled with conflict and the situation further deteriorated in 
Somalia. Tens of thousands of people fled the country for refugee camps in neighboring 
countries. Some of the refugees died on the way, many were in such bad shape that their 
health could not be restored.
135
 The UNPOS, IGAD and the U.S. diplomatic mission 
continued to function in Nairobi, Kenya. 
d.  Analysis: Through the Four Pillars 
(1)  1st Pillar: Safe and Secure Environment.  Lack of security 
has always been the most significant problem in Somalia affecting all pillars of post-
conflict reconstruction. Provision of aid delivery, reconstruction, and supervision were 
hindered by crimes and other security threats. It is alleged by some aid officials that only 
20% of the aid reached to the people in need.
136
 Lack of security hindered a permanent 
international presence in Somalia; international assistance was managed from Nairobi 
through numerous working groups. Most of the duties were carried out by national staff 
(Somalis), often without actual supervision of international managers.
137
 The 
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international aid delivery was frequently interrupted and eventually halted because aid 
workers who remained in Somalia suffered attacks, abductions and arbitrary detention. 
Density of aid delivery activities increased in more secure areas. Although humanitarian 
needs were greater in south central Somalia, the international community has less access 
to south central Somalia than the relatively safer northern part of the country. This is 
significant in showing how security is necessary for the success of the other pillars. 
During the first phase, UNOSOM managed to provide a safe and 
secure environment for humanitarian workers to deliver aid;
138
 however, during 
UNOSOM II the security pillar turned out to be a failure. Although both operations 
started with enough manpower and authority, the latter lost focus on its duties, was 
deprived of its binding power by the UNSC, and was finally withdrawn. As the situation 
worsened it created a safe haven for terrorist organizations.   AMISOM, on the other 
hand, suffered from a lack of manpower as well as funds. For example, 2,400 troops of 
AMISOM proved too little to provide security in Somalia.
139
 The Ugandan troops faced 
dire challenges in Mogadishu and reduced their efforts to protect just the airport, the 
seaport and the presidential compound. A calculation pointed out that at least 20,000 
troops would be needed in order to restore peace in Somalia.
140
 This number is even 
small relative to the number of troops of UNITAF—25,000 excluding civilians. 
The DDR program started at the beginning of 1993 but later failed.  
The UN couldn’t manage to adopt a strategy to implement it, either enforcing or 
convincing warlords. The UN’s arms embargo imposed in January 23, 1992 by UNSCR 
733 still has bad effects on the security and DDR in Somalia. While illicit actors could 
always breach the embargo making the country awash with arms,
141
 legal actors were 
restricted within their activities such as training indigenous troops and police forces, 
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which require arms and armed training to overcome insurgencies. But the UN hasn’t 
lifted the embargo, although it was called for several times by the AU and IGAD.
142
 
After decades of civil war, a generation of young Somalis became 
uneducated and had only one job opportunity: to work for the militias. The businessmen 
earlier paid taxes to warlords for their protection, but later decided to hire their own 
militias. In recent times even sharia courts have started to establish their own militias and 
sell security services to businessmen. According to Emathe, the average salary of an 
armed man was as low as a dollar or two a day in 2003.
143
 This low compensation led to 
another problem—young people started to leave the insurgency, becoming unemployed 
but still armed. The result was an increase in offenses against property, and kidnapping 
for ransom in particular. 
The situation worsened through 2010 as Shabab increased its 
power. It also managed to disseminate its ideology among the population using media 
and the Internet successfully.
144
 Shabab later declared allegiance to al-Qaeda in February 
2010, and claimed responsibility for the bombing of a restaurant in Kampala, Uganda, 
killing 75 people. The bombing was intended to send a message to countries that have 
sent troops to support Somalia’s transitional government.145 It managed to gain support of 
the population by providing some services such as security, law and order, and some 
social services.
146
 Subsequently, the security situation deteriorated to such an intolerable 
extent that the aid workers left the country.   
Another negative effect of a lack of security was piracy off the 
shore of Somalia. In 2007, 15 kidnapping events occurred off the shore of Somalia, three 
of which belonged to WFP (chartered by WFP to carry the humanitarian aid stuff), and 
pirates captured ten vessels including three large tankers with 130 crewmen captured in 
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 The aid organizations faced the problem of finding vessels willing to 
transport aid materials despite the fear of pirates. 
(2) 2nd Pillar: Government and Participation.  The 
international community established two transitional governments: the TNG in 2000 and 
the TFG in 2004. In February 2006, the TFG managed to assemble a transitional 
parliament in Baidoa. The UN and the U.S. implemented several programs to increase the 
capacity and the credibility of the TFG. The UNDP funded construction of government 
buildings in Baidoa, provided technical assistance, facilitated the import of economic 
experts and legal advisers from diaspora, and supported the administration reform.
148
 
However, the lack of binding power over the government coupled with institutional 
weakness caused more problems and not many ways to solve them. The TFG soldiers 
once violated a UN base and arrested the senior officer of the WFP; another time the 
government closed the air strips, compelling aid transportation to travel rough and 
insecure roads.  Every so often TFG soldiers stopped the aid convoys and wanted to 
collect taxes. In 2007, the TFG imposed restrictions on aid delivery and restricted UN 
agencies to the use of governmental buildings and airports.
149
 Had there been a binding 
power by internationals over the TFG, all these problems could have been solved easily, 
much as it happened in Kosovo. 
For both the TNG and TFG, a form of power sharing was arranged 
according to a plan called “4.5 formula” in which the four chief clans were given equal 
representation in the government and assembly; a half portion was reserved for all other 
smaller groups to accrue in cooperation.
150
  However, a mistake by the international 
community occurred when they deployed a president from Darod clan-family, which has 
ruled the country since the independence. The first Prime Minister Shermaarke, who later 
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became the second president, was from Darod as well as Barre.
151
 All these governments 
settled Darods into key positions and favored citizens of Darod origin in their activities. 
When the international community installed TFG with a Darod president, Abdullahi 
Yusuf, Aideed and other Hawiye warlords vehemently rejected this idea, believing that 
Darods had ruled the country long enough. 
Islamism also severely challenged the TFG. From 2006 on, the 
UIC increased its strength and began challenging the government. Before the Ethiopian 
invasion began, the TFG had control over a little part of south central Somalia, 
Mogadishu, and surrounding areas, and the rest of south Somalia was under control of the 
UIC. Ironically, some of the public services the government was unable to deliver were 
provided by the UIC for six months.   It was also confirmed by some UN and NGO 
members that, “During UIC rule of 6 months before pushed back by Ethiopians, there 
was a relative secure environment and the aid workers had healthier access to project 
sites.”152 
The weakness of the TFG was not only its incompetency of 
providing security or geographic limits; it also suffered from a lack of popular support. 
Another weakness was institutional dysfunction due to the lack of staff. Some of the 
ministries were made up of only a minister with no staff or office building. In some 
meetings with international actors, TFG representatives were not able to participate 
because there was no staff and only an acting minister.
153
  The members of the TFG 
started to struggle against each other, and some took the line of prime minister, some of 
president, and some of the spokesman of the national assembly. Prime Minister Ali 
Muhammad Ghedi, for example, resigned in October 2007 after a protracted feud with 
President Yusuf.
154
 In December 2008, President Yusuf dismissed Prime Minister Nur 
Hassan Hussein, although he gained a 143–20 confidence vote from parliament.  
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President Yusuf resigned later in the power struggle. Parliament selected a modest cleric, 
Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, as president of Somalia in January 2009, and he appointed a 
diplomat, Omar Abdirashid Ali Shermaarke, as prime minister.   Although there was 
great hope from the president and prime minister, they were at odds with each other and 
Shermaarke resigned in November 2010.
155
 
The country’s territories were first divided by de facto domains of 
warlords and were later divided into geographic pieces. In May 1991, the northwestern 
part of the country, Somaliland, declared its independence and called itself as “Republic 
of Somaliland.” Later in 1998 in the Northeast, Puntland declared its autonomy with 
willingness and the hope of forming an autonomous province of a peaceful Somalia in the 
future. Again in 1998, the autonomous south region of Jubaland (also called Azania) 
declared its independence, allegedly with the help of Kenya, which wanted to form a 
bumper zone between its land and Somalia.  The northern entities of Somaliland and 
Puntland have had a relatively better situation than southcentral Somalia. They somehow 
managed to provide a number of services to their population, establish a couple of 
democratic institutions, and limited violence up to some extent while south central 
Somalia continued to suffer humanitarian disaster. 
(3) 3rd Pillar: Economic and Social Wellbeing.  The 
international community achieved little in terms of advancing the economic and social 
well-being of the people in Somalia. The efforts could not pass beyond aid delivery 
activities, which they only managed in the initial phases of the intervention. 
Unfortunately, the international community failed to continue their initial success. 
According to the UN, the number of people in need of aid increased from 1.5 million in 
September 1992 to 3.2 million out of 8 million Somalis in 2008.
156
  The same year, one-
sixth of the infants were at risk of starving to death and some 1 million were displaced.
157
 
The situation further deteriorated with the effects of drought in the region. Food prices 
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were spiraling and the Somali shilling was drastically losing value. Despite international 
efforts, the severe malnutrition conditions in the country did not heal. This was 
interrelated to failure in the security pillar; lack of security hindered a large portion of the 
aid delivery, particularly in the rural areas. These effects regrettably compounded the 
poor health situation in the country. 
According to UN Human Development Report 2006, access to 
clean water among the population was 29%, life expectancy at birth was 46 years, and the 
mortality rate of children under 5 was 13.5%.
158
 From 2001 through 2007 the mean 
global malnutrition rate throughout Somalia was 15.6%, a bit higher than the emergency 
threshold of 15%.  In 2008 the malnutrition rates were again reportedly below the 
emergency threshold. The GAO (United States Governmental Accountability Office) 
mentioned that despite all international efforts, the malnutrition rates in Somalia could 
not be reduced.
159
   
Total international humanitarian aid from 2001 through 2007 
reached $1 billion.  Roughly 47% of this money, $349 million, was spent for food aid; 
$362 million of which was provided by the U.S. government for stabilization and 
reconstruction efforts, not including the U.S.’s $47 million funding for development 
programs through NGOs and UNDP to support programs on capacity building of the civil 
society, conflict mitigation, and increasing access to the basic services.160 The goal of 
this assistance was to increase the credibility of the government and local administrations 
through building their capacity to administrate and supply basic services like water, 
education, and health.  Since 2001, several attempts were made on development and 
infrastructure projects. The Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), a joint 5-
year program, was developed by the participation of the UN and World Bank in 2006 to 
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plan national development efforts. However, little was achieved due to the lack of 
security, political stability, and reconciliation among the groups.
161
 
Little was done to restore the school system, and most of the 
schools fell under the control of the UIC. Low school attendance rates reduced the 
number of the qualified workers in society.
162
    
(4) 4th Pillar: Justice and Reconciliation.  In this pillar, 
moderate efforts were made in order to achieve reconciliation and inter-community 
peace.  However, those efforts failed due to the inability to effectively provide aid 
delivery and the security task of reconstruction, institution building tasks such as 
establishing a court system, and correction. Although a police service was established, it 
was only functional in several neighborhoods of the capital. On the flip side, clan elders 
from different informal entities such as businessmen and Islamic clergy continued to 
oversee sharia courts. As Emathe points out, the sharia courts managed to provide order 
up to an extent and appealed to public opinion, because people were tired of arbitrary 
violence, ruthless crimes and other results of statelessness.
163
 
The National Reconciliation Committee (NRC) was established in 
2007, and in good faith it called for a ceasefire and redistribution of land and homes to 
actual owners. Financial aid assistance came from the UNDP (United Nations 
Development Program) that provided $8 million for these efforts. USAID became a 
primary actor and facilitated several meetings to encourage dialogue between clan 
leaders.
164
 Additionally, UN representatives chaired meetings and launched some projects 
to increase awareness through peace and reconciliation by distributing stickers and t-
shirts, and displaying banners. A total of 2,600 delegates participated in the NRC 
meetings in Mogadishu during the months of July and August of 2007, representing the 
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clans, women, and diaspora.
165
 The negotiation efforts were not inclusive enough, and 
several opposition groups boycotted the NRC. Had these groups participated in the 
system, negotiations may have further achieved their goals. 
In September 2007 opposition groups such as the UIC, former 
representatives of TFG, various clan elders, and participants from the diaspora further 
diminished the chances of reconciliation by meeting separately in Asmara, Eritrea. They 
called themselves the Alliance for Liberation and Reconstruction of Somalia. Their 
declaration mostly cited the liberation of Somalia from Ethiopian invasion, and a new 
comprehensive political process to build a nation state with the participation of all 
Somalia stakeholders.
166
 Several attempts by the UNPOS to bring these two negotiation 
processes together resulted in failure due to the lack of competent power.  
3. Yemen   
a.  Introduction 
 
Figure 1.   Map of Conflicts within Yemen167 
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Yemen is currently one of those failing states with a lack of basic services, 
political tension, and ethno-religious disputes that prevent the government from 
functioning outside the capital city of Sana’a, while the surrounding ungoverned areas 
provide a safe haven for insurgent and terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP) in the forefront.  Unfortunately for the people of Yemen, the country 
is fractured due to tensions between the government and the country’s many tribes.  The 
primary players are the Huthis in the northwest portion of the state that are predominately 
Shia, while al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and their cells are scattered 
throughout the state, and finally Al-Harak al-Salmi al-Janoubi, a large peaceful southern 
movement coalition of groups that prefer secession from the North.168  Figure 1 
demonstrates how the country is divided with clashes among the major players.  
Additionally, the lack of unity among the tribes, coupled with an abundance of weapons, 
prevent diplomatic solutions on two counts.  First, the tribes and the government allow 
tension to escalate into armed conflict with little chance of reaching agreement, and 
second, other tribal leaders are paid off for their quiescence. 
As the primary focus of this thesis, the goal is to identify the underlying 
causes of state failure in Yemen, the impact within the international community, and the 
shortcomings of international interventions.  In the midst of a movement that has been 
spreading through the Middle East coined the Arab Spring, Yemen has gained attention 
on a global scale.  Like an uncontrollable wildfire, leaders that have remained in power 
far too long are succumbing to the heat of protesters, as well as the blaze from NATO 
guns. Is Yemen the next country to find itself in the crosshairs?   
A Common Country Assessment (CCA) dated 2005 by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) identified the following reasons for the poor outcome of 
development interventions in Yemen: the lack of transparency and participation, the 
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monopoly of power, the disempowerment of women and children, unfair and 
unsustainable use of water resources, and a high unemployment rate with a population 
growth to match.169 
This begs the question: can Yemen be shaped into a stable state through its 
own self-determination, or will it require international intervention to make it possible?  
There is a school of thought from a variety of scholars on what is required for a state to 
remain stable and prevent a drift towards an ugly ending.  To avert Yemen’s demise of 
becoming a failed state or the unthinkable, a collapsed state such as Somalia; this part of 
the thesis will focus on four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction subjugated to a binding 
power from the United Nations or any other form of international intervener, and 
initiatives that would restore the state.    
b. Historical and Cultural Issues: A Troubled Marriage Running 
On Fumes  
The prevailing religion throughout Yemen’s population is Islam, with 
Sunni Muslims in the majority over the followers of Shi’a Islam who are the Zaydis 
located in the north and northwest of Yemen.  The Shufi’s are followers of Sunni Islam 
located primarily in the south.
170
  The creation of the Zaidi Imamate in 897 was an 
important landmark in the history of Yemen, as this minority group has been politically 
active in northern Yemen from the 10th century until 1962.  During an unsuccessful coup 
attempt, Imam Yahya (1869–1948), who was the ruler of North Yemen and believed to 
be a descendant of Mohammad, was assassinated on February 17, 1948 with succession 
going to his son Ahmad.
171
 
In the south, Yemenis began to realize their own potential and organized a 
revolt led by the Nationalist Liberation Front that pushed out the British who had 
occupied the city of Aden since 1919.  However, the country remained split in two.  This 
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provided an opportunity for outside actors to instill their influence for the two sides; with 
the Soviets backing the south and Egypt and Jordan supporting the royalists in the 
north.
172
  Three-hundred years of separation between North and South Yemen ended as 
the two united on May 22, 1990, creating the Republic of Yemen.  At that time, Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, who had been the ruler in the north since 1978, was elected as the 
president of the new country.  The marriage between the communist south and tribal 
north became a dysfunctional one and the honeymoon phase quickly ended.  A civil war 
erupted in 1994 over issues such as power sharing and the speed of integration between 
the two areas, their peoples, and parliament.
173
   
Since the beginning of the civil war, the economy has continued to spiral 
downward.  According to the IMF, revenue from petroleum and agriculture resources is 
declining in Yemen.  Oil accounts for 90% of Yemen’s export revenue, 60% of which is 
used for government revenue.174  Another source of income for Yemen is through 
agriculture; however, water resources are becoming depleted.  The average amount of 
annual rainfall is five inches or less.  Most farmland is watered through terrace irrigation 
to supplement rainfall and with water from underground aquifers which have been 
overused.
175
   
Coffee, once a primary crop in Yemen, has been replaced with a plant that 
produces a mild stimulant when the leaves are chewed.  This plant is called Qat and has 
become a pillar of daily life and the rural economy.  According to the bulletin that is 
published by the World Health Organization (WHO), qat is a social but addictive drug 
used by as much as 90% of adult men and approximately 50% of women.  Qat is chewed 
with friends, family and colleagues throughout the day or at any type of social event.  The 
WHO considers qat to have amphetamine-like properties that gives a “high” comparable 
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to a strong cup of coffee.176 Qat has become an important cash crop because it can be 
harvested up to four times a year with a higher payoff to the farmers over other crops.   
In his article, Leonard Milich identifies the strain on the water supply due 
to the excessive irrigation required for qat that only compounds the problems of the 
agricultural productivity, household food, economic security, and health that are just as 
stressed.  Its production occupies more than one-third of Yemen’s scarce arable land, 
more than double that from a decade ago.177  On October 31, 2011, UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon announced at a press event from the UN Headquarters a new 
milestone to the world population by reaching seven billion.
178  
With population growth 
expected to double within the next 20–30 years, the demand for qat will continue to grow 
inside Yemen, which in turn will further reduce the land available for growing food and 
continue to strain the water tables.   
c. International Intervention 
Yemen is constantly in the headlines and it doesn’t take much research to 
see that Yemen is plagued with numerous factors creating conflict and destabilizing the 
region.  Those factors range from widespread corruption and a weak state institution, 
compounded with a rapid growing population, diminishing natural resources and 
repression of the populace.  This has not gone unnoticed by the international community 
and there has been assistance from a variety of actors and supporters; however, much 
more needs to be done. There have been numerous agencies providing aid to Yemen.  In 
fact, the World Bank is financing 28 projects with commitments totaling more than $1 
billion U.S. dollars with $673.5 million disbursed as of December 2010.179  Much of this 
aid is focused on operations and investment projects in vital sectors such as water, urban 
developments, education, agriculture and rural development, transportation, and energy. 
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Before the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 and the attacks on 9/11, the 
U.S.-Yemeni relationship remained at arm’s length. The United States never invested 
heavily in Yemen, nor have Yemenis seen the United States as a benefactor.   Lately 
there has been more cooperation between the United States and Yemen, primarily with 
the concern about terrorism; but at the same time, President Saleh is maintaining a 
balancing act to avoid the perception of being too friendly with the West.  However, the 
United States Agency for International Aid (USAID) has extended its support to Yemen 
in the areas of health, education, economic growth and security.  According to their 
website, USAID provided training and equipment to 1,500 midwives and dispatched 11 
mobile medical teams that treat more than 4,000 patients per month.180  Education in 
Yemen is among the lowest in the region and, with the assistance of USAID, the goal is 
to reverse the trend by expanding access to education in the poorest areas by providing 
training for teachers, reading materials and school supplies to over 200,000 students in 
more than 135 schools with a focus on girls’ primary schooling.  USAID is also 
supporting projects in the areas of infrastructure, farming, veterinary services and small 
enterprise support. USAID also addresses security concerns by disengaging the youth 
from being recruited by extremists and expanding basic service providers.181 
 d. Analysis: Through the Four Pillars 
(1) First Pillar: Safe and Secure Environment.  Unfortunately 
for the security of Yemen as a whole, police and military services can only function in 
and around the capital of Sana’a, thus allowing the security situation to deteriorate.  In 
Sana’a and the city of Taiz, protests erupted with outbreaks from protestors of both 
factions, pro-government and anti-government.  These protestors continue to call for the 
resignation of President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
182
 The unified Yemen felt the pain of its 
decision when the country voted against the UN Security Council Resolution 678 that 
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authorized the use of force to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait.183 Yemen’s decision 
would cost them on two fronts: U.S. foreign aid to Yemen was stopped for the next ten 
years, which at that time amounted to U.S. $70 million a year; and Saudi Arabia and 
other gulf states deported hundreds of thousands of Yemen workers that burdened the 
Yemen Treasury Department.184   
During the passage of the new millennium, cooperation became 
better between the U.S. and Yemen military as the concern for al-Qaeda increased. In 
2000, while at port in Aden, the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole was attacked killing 17 
American sailors and wounding another 37.185  Additionally, an attack on a French ship, 
the Limburg, by terrorists in October of 2002, the failed Christmas 2009 bombing attempt 
of a Northwest Airliner, and packages shipped from Yemen with explosive material 
indicate that there are terrorists groups either in Yemen or receiving support from some 
factions within the country.   
Since 9/11, the U.S. has increased its cooperation with Yemen 
through counterterrorism training and establishing a small private Special Forces unit.  
Additionally, funding has increased from $70 million in 2001 to $190 million as of 2010, 
primarily to be used by the Yemen army for training and counterterrorism operations.186  
In 2009, the U.S. sent 200 Special Forces for training and information sharing.187  
Surveillance flights and targeted killings also continued with the use of drones, such as 
the one that killed Anwar Al-Awlaki in September 2011. To ensure that al-Qaeda does 
not increase its grip within the country with the ability to train and conduct operations 
freely, U.S. military aid and cooperation will continue to grow.  Yemen also receives 
funding for International Military Education and Training (IMET) to send officers to the 
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United States to study at military colleges and institutions.  Yemeni officers have 
received English language instructions from the Defense Language Institute with IMET 




The Yemeni armed forces have also begun receiving U.S. Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) for outdated equipment.  According to the Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency (DSCA) that manages the FMF, grants have helped Yemen’s Air 
Force with sustainment of their two C-130H aircraft that are more than 30 years old, as 
well as their small detachment of F-5 fighter aircraft.189  Yemen’s Coast Guard has also 
benefited from the development and training by the United States through FMF grants.  
Sharp also identified in his CRS report how FMF funds are also used to supplement 
training for Yemen’s Ministry of Interior Forces, specifically from the U.S.-funded 
Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) inside the Central Security Force, an internal unit 
controlled directly by General Yahya Mohammed Abdullah Saleh, the president’s 
nephew.
190
  The Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 
authorized the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to 
provide $75 million in aid (equipment, supplies, and training) to enhance the ability of 
the Yemen Ministry of Interior Counter Terrorism Forces for operations against al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula and its affiliates.
191
 
Yemen is flooded with small arms that are available in the open 
market as well as the black market throughout the country.  The Small Arms Survey 
estimates that there are approximately 10 million civilian firearms in circulation; in other 
words, one for every two Yemenis.192  Efforts from the government to curb proliferation 
have mostly been unsuccessful because of the tribal culture in which the bearing of arms 
is a longstanding tradition.  Although, carrying weapons openly in public has become 
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more of a rural issue than within city limits, the proliferation of small arms continues to 
contribute to insecurity by making weapons readily available to terrorist and criminal 
organizations. According to the resource center from the United Nations, there is no DDR 
program in the Middle East, unlike the cases in Somalia and Kosovo.193  Nonetheless, the 
U.S. assisted the Yemen government with a buy-back program in 2003 to reduce the 
number of weapons; however, there was little success of this program due to corruption 
between the locals and the Yemen officials conducting the transactions.  These actions 
included the acceptance of buying a weapon from an individual that was already 
inoperable.  The largest challenge is convincing the public to turn in their weapons.  The 
fear is too great for the Yemen people to disarm themselves with issues involving 
property disputes and general safety.  Having a weapon helps in the deterrence of blatant 
criminals and the prevention of being an easy target.  
With attempts to demobilize and disarm the Yemen populace, 
Saudi Arabia can be a major benefactor with their experience in de-radicalization of 
prisoners and terrorists.  Additional steps can be taken by the Yemen government in 
reforms to the correction systems that are classified in a dire state.  The situation of the 
prisons exacerbates a climate for radicals and the recruitment of terrorist.  Extremist 
groups are using the prisons as a classroom for their indoctrination and political training 
which only strengthens the position of terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda.194 
(2) Second Pillar: Government and Participation.  The 
effectiveness of Yemen’s government is alarmingly weak.  An assessment from the 
World Bank places the effectiveness of the government at the bottom 17th percentile in 
the world; its ranking on control of corruption is in the bottom 33rd percentile.195   
Unfortunately, corruption flows through Yemen in all aspects of the government and 
society as a whole. The government fails to create any institutions that support the basic 
needs of its citizens.  Corruption is the fuel that keeps the elite in power. 
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The power struggle between the government and the opposition 
has triggered demands of democracy among the people; however, it has not resulted in 
reforms. After 33 years of ruling, President Saleh sees his power dwindling without a 
trusted successor acceptable by the overall populace.  On several occasions in the early 
part of 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) negotiated an exit strategy for the 
President Saleh with a clause for immunity.  President Saleh finally agreed to the GCC 
plan in June 2011; however, he was wounded during an attack on the presidential 
compound and evacuated to Saudi Arabia for treatment.  Upon his return to Yemen, 
Saleh reversed his decision.  Although he is waffling on the decision to step down, critics 
recognize that Saleh has played this strategy before and few believe that he will never 
resign.  However, the game has changed and President Saleh may not have a choice this 
time.  With the demise of Gaddafi so fresh and brutal, the window for a graceful exit is 
rapidly closing for the Yemen President.  His biggest adversary has become General Ali 
Mohsen al-Ahmar who commands Yemen’s northwestern military district and has 
declared that his forces will protect the people.     
The opposition parties in Yemen have been heated over President 
Saleh’s amendment to the electoral law, forming a new Supreme Commission for 
Elections and Referenda (SCER), and amending the constitution such that it would allow 
him to stand for reelection.  In his report, Sharp states that parliament passed an 
amendment to the electoral law that allowed the SCER to be comprised of judges rather 
than representatives appointed by members of parliament. This occurred in December 
2010 while the opposition resisted the amendment. For almost three years, the 
composition of the SCER has been contested by the members of the opposition with 
charges that it is comprised of Saleh loyalists who are unwilling to make the electoral 
system free and fair.196 
Although the military and police services fall under the control of 
the President, they are often criticized of repressing the media and the opposition.  
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Oppression was reported during the 2003 elections; however, since that time, the 
situation has improved with fewer complaints from the candidates and journalist.197  
Resistance to external intervention also makes state-building 
assistance that much more difficult. In January 2010, for example, 150 clerics issued a 
fatwa rejecting military cooperation with the United States and calling for jihad in the 
event of foreign military intervention.198 
(3) Third Pillar: Economic and Social Wellbeing.  The failing 
state situation continues to impact the economy in Yemen as oil resources, the main 
source of revenue, declines.   According to the CIA World Fact Book, the population 
growth is estimated at 2.65 percent as of July, 2011, with a total population of 
24,133,492, and nearly half the population living below the poverty level.199  Yemen’s 
inability to control its own population makes it highly probable that it will continue to be 
infiltrated by others who are not interested in its success as a state, but rather in its 
demise. Even though there are some efforts by international actors to fix the economy, a 
lack of unity of efforts combined with little cooperation from the current regime prevents 
recovery. The efforts to develop other sources of revenue such as natural gas and non-oil 
dependent industries should be unified.  Also, water management with programs such as 
rainwater collection and irrigation systems would prove extremely beneficial.200  With 
half the border of Yemen on the sea, investments in desalination plants supported by the 
GCC states would be an optional venue to solve the water supply.  Although a very 
expensive solution that would prove difficult for the mountain cities such as Sana’a, it 
could however alleviate problems in lower-altitude areas.  
Yemen has received very little financial aid from the international 
community.  To illustrate this point, the total amount of aid received by Yemen in 2005 
equated to $335 million, working out to $16 per capita.  In contrast, Palestinians received 
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$303 per capita in the same year.  The following year, in 2006, the GGC pledged $4 
billion; however, only 15% of the promise has been fulfilled since 2010.201 
One of the most important partners to Yemen is the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia; although in the past the policy was to weaken the central government.  
According to the 2008 annual report of the Saudi Development Fund, over $460 million 
in loans were made available to Yemen between 1978 and 2008; and since 2009, Riyadh 
made an additional $300 million available to finance highway, electricity, water, health, 
and education programs across the country.
202
 
The current U.S. administration has requested $120.16 million in 
State Department-administered foreign aid to Yemen for FY2012.  For fiscal year 2011, 
the administration requested $106.6 million, but just over half was allocated by Congress 
in the amount of $62.898 million.203  A Yemen report from the U.S. Department of State 
showed other agencies were involved as well.  The IMF has worked with the Yemen 
government to institute a structural adjustment program.  The program included major 
financial and monetary reforms, such as floating the currency, reducing the budget 
deficit, and cutting subsidies. Yemen also receives U.S. economic aid from three primary 
sources: the Economic Support Fund (ESF), the Development Assistance (DA) account, 
and the Global Health Child Survival account (GHCS).204     
In order to increase donor coordination and widen the scope of 
support, the United States and Great Britain helped form the Friends of Yemen Group, a 
multilateral forum of 24 concerned countries that was launched at a January 2010 
conference in London.  The Friends of Yemen group convened in Abu Dhabi two months 
later where they received statements from Yemeni officials that the country requires $44 
billion in aid and investment to support development over the next five years.205 
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As of 2011, the World Bank is involved with 20 active projects 
with Yemen in the areas of public sector governance, water, and education.
206
  
Additionally, the World Bank has teamed up with agencies from France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, European Commission, and United Nations 
agencies for the development of Yemen.  The World Bank Group is also working with 
the IMF on a macroeconomic dialogue, and close dialogues have also been established 
with the GCC Secretariat.207  
In order to rebuild the economy and the human capital of Yemen, 
the health and education system must be addressed before these institutions are 
completely decimated.   Efforts have been attempted to overcome this shortage; however, 
as soon as a clinic or school is opened, it is immediately used for something else or 
closed all together.  There is a mindset that God will provide.  Unfortunately, the lack of 
education continues to be evident with the deficiency of skilled workers in the country.  
The issue of security has a direct impact on the people; many Yemenis that possess a high 
level of education or technical expertise have become expatriates.  Although Saudi 
Arabia has supported Yemen with programs and the financing of training institutions, 
these efforts pale in size to the overall problem that has stricken the country: illiteracy.   
As security continues to be very problematic for the country, it also 
brings a high cost to the economy in several ways.  A prime example is the reduction of 
maritime traffic due to the soaring rate of piracy off the coast of Yemen, primarily from 
its neighbor, Somalia.  As a result, insurance costs have sky rocketed for the rise in 
hijackings and kidnappings of mariners using shipping lanes in the Gulf of Aden. 
(4) Fourth Pillar: Justice and Reconciliation.  The Yemeni 
government recently attempted to reform the judiciary and enhance its capacity. 
However, the weakest link of the three branches of government remains with the court 
systems as it continues to be susceptible to interference from the executive branch.  
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According to Article 149 of Yemen’s constitution, judicial authority is autonomous in its 
judicial, financial, and administrative features.  However, Article 104 of this law assigns 
the president of the republic to the supreme judicial council (SJC). To save the country 
and reduce corruption, a radical judicial reform is required to reduce the interference of 
the president and executive branch over judicial affairs and increase transparency, 
accountability and integrity.  A recent poll from the Yemen Polling Center on bribery 
showed that 4% of respondents believe that the judiciary is the most bribe-ridden sector 
in Yemen.
208
  Judges are routinely bribed and in some cases, they can choose from 
competing bribes between two parties in competition with one another.  It becomes a 
bidding war for the verdict of the judge.  Unfortunately, there is no judicial code that 
establishes a standard of ethics, and local judges are easily pressured and intimidated with 
punishment from higher levels if a judgment is unacceptable. The police are also 
important; as a report authored by Dr. Robinson and associates for USAID, Yemenis 
widely view the police as one of the most corrupt state agencies in Yemen.
209 
 Judicial 
authorities and the police should be more tightly linked and better coordinated to ensure 
that judicial rulings are fully implemented and respected.  
Although the constitution and legal framework afford all citizens 
equal treatment under the law and provided them with the opportunity of a fair trial, in 
practice they are deprived of it. Government crackdowns since 2003 have routinely 
ignored the law by claiming that national security overrides personal rights. In 2004, for 
example, there were two trials reported for not meeting international standards of 
fairness.
210
  Likewise, the legal system remains highly informal, with personal 
connections and networks frequently trumping the dictates of the law.  
There is also a difference between what is regulated by law and 
what is happening on the street. The government’s record on enforcing property rights is 
particularly weak in parts of the country where tribal forces are stronger and government 
                                                 
208 Glenn E. Robinson et al., Yemen Corruption Assessment (Vermont: ARD Inc., [2006]), 12. 
209 Robinson et al., Yemen Corruption Assessment, 12. 
210 Brian Katulis and David Emery, “Country Report: Yemen” Freedomhouse.org, last modified 
November 3, 2011, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?ccrcountry=143&ccrpage=31&edition 
=7&page=140&section=78. 
 83 
authority is limited. Claims, particularly in southern Yemen, have arisen concerning 
government seizure of property and violations of property rights, with charges of unequal 
application of laws being levied.211  
The U.S. State Department provides additional assistance to the 
Yemen training program for judges, prosecutors and police commanders through the 
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related (NADR) programs.  In 2010, 
funds were granted to assist in harmonizing their implementation of criminal law with 
international norms and values in an effort to increase the government’s ability to counter 
terrorism.212  
The police forces are currently under control of only the executive 
branch, reducing their impartiality and effectiveness.  It also undermines the success of 
the judiciary branch.  Reform should be implemented to provide oversight from the 
judiciary branch as well as collaboration between the judges and police commanders.   
The process to equalizing the power among Yemen’s society will 
be a long and arduous one.  Minority rights appear to be a very low priority for President 
Saleh and his regime; reluctance to compromise their power in the belief that no one else 
is capable of leading the country and keeping it unified will continue to trump the issues 
and grievances that plague the Yemen society.  In the eyes of southern Yemenis, there are 
numerous wrongs that must be righted.  These include violations of property rights and 
the exploitation of their business from the northern tribes after unification that led to civil 
war in 1994.  Settling these grievances will drastically reduce the alienation that the south 
has been subjected to, as well as the effects of AQAP. 213   
In order to prevent the possibility of human right violations and 
further destabilization and the country, the international community should establish a 
position that would force the hand of President Saleh to concede concessions and 
implement reform to appease the population.  Yemen relies heavily on its scant oil 
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revenues and financial aid from countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United States, 
which should be stopped to entice the regime for change before assistance resumes.  A 
secondary position should come from a UN resolution that would authorize economic 
sanctions backed by the use of military force if necessary.  The threat or use of military 
force can easily be demonstrated with a naval presence in the Gulf of Aden.   
 85 
V.  ANALYSIS OF THE CASES: WHAT IS THE ALTERNATIVE 
FOR YEMEN AND WHY? 
This chapter analyzes the importance of binding power by comparing and 
contrasting the Kosovo and Somalia interventions while drawing lessons for Yemen and 
future failing state situations. In a failing state the local government is likely to be 
incompetent and corrupt, and its institutions and officials are generally less educated and 
less knowledgeable in comparison to other international professionals. Therefore, if there 
will be an international intervention in Yemen or another country, it must be competent 
comparable to the UNMIK and EULEX missions in Kosovo, with a strong mandate that 
provides a binding power to take necessary actions. Thanks to their binding power, the 
UNMIK and EULEX managed to establish a local government, improve its capability, 
and supervise all of the institutions, while UNOSOM II could not successfully support 
the TFG in Somalia. The interveners in Kosovo also had a robust control over the local 
government, while the UN political office for Somalia functions in Nairobi, Kenya with a 
mandate to just observe and advise. Their advice is not obligatory for local entities. 
UNPOS and other UN associates must function inside the country with an executive and 
stringent mandate like UNMIK and EULEX in Kosovo. The TFG is not under 
international control and sometimes it presents difficulties for humanitarian aid programs. 
In October 2007, TFG soldiers raided UN properties and detained the head officer of the 
World Food Program (WFP). The WFP suspended its functions until the officer was 
released within a few days.
214
 The same year, TFG soldiers demanded fees from passing 
traffic of $20 per vehicle, including the trucks delivering aid before allowing them 
passage.  
The international binding power over local actors doesn’t mean ignoring the 
opinions of local stake holders and the importance of local participation.  On the contrary, 
international actors are more sensitive in terms of respecting ideas and enabling 
participation than local governments. When they are equipped with a strong mandate, 
they will be capable to deliver on their promise and therefore receive respect from the 
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people.  But if the internationals don’t have authority over the local government, their 
efforts may be jeopardized by the actions of local officials or institutions.  Local actors 
have the tendency to ignore the grievances of the population and steal humanitarian aid 
goods for themselves and for profit making.  However, international professionals are 
generally not in need of aid goods, and therefore they have no reason to exploit their 
responsibility to assist.  Since the internationals have all the means for success, such as 
training, education, sensitivity to cultures and discipline, they will ensure rapid success as 
long as they are equipped with a competent mandate. Once success has been observed by 
the local populace, participation and support will follow. 
The immediate steps of intervention such as food delivery, shelter, and security 
also require a binding power by international authorities. In Kosovo, due to their strong 
mandate, the international interveners were successful in achieving these immediate goals 
and passed to the next level of development programs. However, none of these 
immediate goals were accomplished in Somalia and the shift to longer-term goals never 
materialized. Realizing the incapability of the authorities involved to carry out the long-
term development programs, the donors also focused on only food and shelter-based 
donations.
215
  Another effect of the lack of security in Somalia was its hindrance over the 
evaluation of the progress of operations. Therefore, the international community failed to 
make necessary changes and updates.
216
 The Somalia case shows that the international 
intervention both starts and ends with the security pillar. Once security is provided, the 
other pillars will.  This will additionally increase popular support both within the failing 
state and from participating countries, as well as international donations. Consequently, 
security has priority over all the other pillars of post-conflict reconstruction. Had the 
international actors in Somalia been granted a strong mandate, security would have been 
provided effectively, and humanitarian aid could have been delivered successfully.  
Although the authority to use power is provided by Chapter 7 of the UN charter, 
the application was extremely poor in Somalia. The use of power should have been 
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implemented powerfully and impartially. The impartiality should have been displayed 
with good practices and using mass media to target the population for awareness of the 
mission and the goodwill of the peacekeepers. This can constitute a virtuous cycle: 
establishing the order and providing aid and services, increasing the number of the people 
buying into the operations. Adding these masses into the system will enhance the power 
of the operators in accelerating their efforts, as well as increase contributions from 
international donors. For Yemen and future cases, international military and police forces 
should be equipped with a powerful mandate to establish security as soon as possible, and 
establish and supervise the local security apparatus. Once a certain level of security is 
accomplished, the international forces should maintain their posture until local forces 
prove maturity. 
Although a lack of manpower was often cited as the reason for failure in many 
cases, in reality, the true cause stemmed from insufficient binding power.  The African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) suffered from a lack of manpower, unable to 
provide effective security, protect the transitional government, support reconciliation 
processes, facilitate aid delivery, but most importantly, failed to achieve progress due to 
the lack of binding power.
217
  Even if they had been granted more troops they would have 
failed due to the lack of binding power.  It is imperative to have the appropriate authority 
combined with the necessary manpower.  A police station without appropriate legal 
authority having twice the number of required officers would be less effective than a 
smaller force with authority, such as having the power to stop a car, use necessary force, 
and make arrests, otherwise they will fail. Although we assert that UNMIK had enough 
manpower, it would not have achieved its goal without the binding power.  Furthermore, 
the governments in Somalia, Kosovo, and Yemen are all corrupt and incompetent and 
their officers are generally poorly trained, unaware of universal norms and values, less 
sensitive to human rights, and less funded compared to international professionals.  If the 
country and the people are left to their own devices, they will not be able to achieve 
success.  
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In Kosovo, UNMIK and EULEX affiliates have managed to show their respect 
for the local culture and therefore cultivate strong relationships with the population. The 
same method can be possible in Somalia and Yemen. Since Islam has strong effects on 
the Somalia and Yemen population, the solution should include some religious 
dimensions. To increase the legitimacy of the TFG, moderate Islamists groups could have 
been supported and their positions should have been strengthened against the war-prone 
extremists.
218
 In return, their support would be gained by the TFG and the international 
intervening actors, and this support could have been announced to the population using 
the media and Internet. This information operation should have targeted the rifts inside 
and between extremist groups such as the UIC and Shabab. To counter the propaganda of 
terrorist organizations and appease the sediment of perception that Christians occupy 
their Muslim land, the number of peacekeeping personnel from Muslim countries and 
non-Muslims should have been balanced. Until this goal was achieved, Christian 
countries could have focused on financing and their presence could have been reduced 
until the problem was overcome. The efforts of the Arabic countries that create the GCC 
in Yemen are worthwhile in this context. It is essential that the tribal issues of Yemen be 
considered in such a manner as to ensure they are not alienated, but rather embraced.  
This approach will assist in the transformation of a country that is split with tribal ideas 
and factions to an open and fair state for the entire population.   Aid programs and other 
means of international interventions should be more integrated with a more assertive 
approach to ensure reform is achieved in the country.   
Unilateral engagements should be avoided as demonstrated in several scenarios. 
The Ethiopian invasion into Somalia, for example, advertised their mission as a 
peacekeeping effort.  However, it only exacerbated the situation and prolonged the 
animosity between two nations; nor were Ethiopian troops there for international peace. 
There should have been a multinational approach including other nations welcomed by 
Somalis, such as Arabic or Muslim countries. In Kosovo, where the UNMIK was highly 
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successful, the composition of forces was pluralistic enough with peacekeepers from all 
around the world, including Americans and Russians.  
 90 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Since the tasks are highly interconnected and interdependent, a successful 
international intervention in failing states requires all four pillars to be addressed 
simultaneously, with the priority on security and aid delivery tasks in the initial phase.  
Since security is the most essential thing in the post-conflict environment, all issues 
relating to security must be addressed effectively starting from the very beginning.  Aid 
delivery must be fulfilled in this secure condition and the initial steps of other pillars 
must follow these phases.
219
  Since failing states are unable to provide a safe and secure 
environment, security should be supplied by international military or police forces, 
beginning in the early phases of intervention until the country recovers.   
Binding authority of the international interveners has significant importance for 
interventions of failing states.  There is strong empirical data to support this argument. 
All of the international interventions that had a comprehensive binding mandate were 
successful, while most of the voluntary approach and weak mandate interventions failed. 
The complex interventions in Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor achieved their goals 
one after another. First, they succeeded in providing security while humanitarian workers 
delivered aid to heal the wounds of conflict. Then they tackled comprehensive 
democratic peace-building tasks to create new institutions.  In Cambodia, UNTAC 
possessed the power to administer elections, create local institutions to run these 
elections, and to enforce mandatory instructions over all governmental institutions. On 
February 16, 1991, the Paris Agreements authorized UNTAC with a higher power to 
suspend or repeal the laws in effect.
220
  Cambodia was a unique case that achieved 
unprecedented success because of this large mandate and binding power. It was the first 
successful mission to enshrine the right to establish multiple political parties and conduct 
a fair election to establish a legal civil authority in the country.
221
 In Kosovo, UNMIK 
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had a similar mandate with the power to run elections, establish, advice, and supervise a 
government, and guarantee rights and liberties of the population. Both missions gradually 
transferred the responsibilities and power to local institutions while maintaining the right 
to supervise.  The East Timor intervention also followed a similar approach as Kosovo 
and Cambodia with some subtle differences. Due to the early reach of success, the UN 
started its withdrawal creating a power vacuum that led to an upheaval in the community.  
Fortunately, the mission was able to reestablish itself and restore order soon after.  
Likewise, the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan are heading towards similar success. 
The same approach can be adopted for a future intervention in Yemen.   
Democracy and human rights are also indispensable for international intervention. 
The people of failing states are generally aware not only of the economic wellbeing, but 
also democratic liberties of the western world. When they hear about international 
intervention, a rise occurs in the expectation of democracy building. Otherwise, it would 
be difficult to achieve legitimacy and popular support for the weak or new government. 
After the decolonization process, the new generation international intervention operations 
were implemented as democracy building activities. They included three universal bases 
of democracy: fair elections, freedom of assembly, and freedom of expression.
222
  In this 
perspective, UNTAC was significant in proving that the international community could 
achieve the goal of democracy building along with peacekeeping.  
Another key tenet for post-conflict reconstruction is accountability, and is almost 
as important as security. Lack of accountability causes inefficient use of resources and 
therefore failure of aid delivery and development programs.
223
 Accountability must be 
maintained for all programs and actions. Instead of broad goals with collective 
responsibility, an approach with definite responsibilities on certain persons must be 
adopted. As Easterly emphasizes, feedback from the field is essential for accountability. 
He makes an analogy of reconstruction activities with marketing activities. In the market, 
customers provide feedback by buying the products or returning the items if they are not 
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of good quality. They are able to hold the manufacturer responsible if the product is not 
good enough. If the product works with no problem there will be rewards for the 
producer in the form of the profit of the transaction. Likewise, during the intervention, 
feedback should be provided from the field, evaluated objectively, and mechanisms must 
be established to track accountability in the lower, medium, and higher level 
administration. 
A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
International interveners must have binding power over local governments to 
impose rules and supervise the institutions as in the cases of Kosovo, Cambodia, and East 
Timor.  It is necessary to remember that the host government failed to solve their 
problems and that is ultimately why the international actors are there. Primary 
responsibility must be held by the UN and gradually handed over to the new local 
government.  However, UN supervision must be maintained until the government proves 
its maturity.  This does not mean local participation and the ideas of the local actors can 
be disregarded. With a balanced approach, local participation and ownership should be 
facilitated to increase the legitimacy of the government and keep potential spoilers under 
control. International peacekeepers must show respect to their ideas while their awareness 
is increased through workshops and training programs.   
International assistance should start when signals identify a path to failure: dense 
ethnic conflict, refugee flow, and massive human rights violations.  The international 
community can impose sanctions over the government and opposition groups to ease the 
tension and prevent state failure.  
Unilateral interventions must be avoided and a broad multinational participation 
should be adopted. Ethiopian occupation of Somalia only exacerbated the resentment of 
the extremist groups as well as their propaganda. UN involvement and leadership is 
equally important, because of its universality, and most importantly, its impartiality.  The 
U.S. should also be involved in the intervention due to its political and economic 
influence, leverage in negotiations, and deterrence on malicious actors. When the U.S. 
has no interest in the intervention its symbolic involvement will also be beneficial.  
 94 
The authority to make decisions must be granted to the teams in the field of the 
host country. A remote control approach from capital cities of the states and UN 




The role of the military is essential for many cases, but civilian actors have a 
comparative advantage over military. Therefore, the role of NGOs, private sector, civilian 
police, World Bank, and diplomats must be increased while the military footprint is 
reduced with the exception of the initial phase.   
The relay approach is irrevocable in international intervention; however, the main 
actors must remain the same throughout the course of the intervention. The timeline must 
be calculated realistically with a comprehensive plan developed according to theoretical 
scientific information, and the historical and socio-political background of the country.  
Instead of getting stuck on infeasible and vast objectives, such as ending poverty 
or eradicating malaria in the world, an approach with a creative piecemeal solution must 
be adopted. Feasible piecemeal programs, for example quick impact projects, cash for 
school programs, and the mosquito net program in Malawi, can achieve gradual success 
and therefore more support from donors.
225
  
Accountability must be brought to all programs and actions. Broad goals and 
collective responsibility weaken the incentives of workers and institutions; instead, the 
system should burden specific responsibilities on certain institutions and individuals for 
specific tasks.  A feedback flow from the field should be obtained for an effective 
implementation of accountability. 
The intervention should be programmed in a manner that harnesses the 
participation of the locals through long-term goals of the intervention. The main goal of  
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interveners is the success of the program, but it is personal gains for the local 
participants.
226
 In this respect, it is essential to embrace the impoverished people 
including the landless poor. 
There must be a tiny space to allow for corruption. After the first phase of 
immediate aid delivery and security, a transparent and competitive program must be 
adopted and announced.
227
 The international interveners must standardize their own 
contracts through certain transparent processes, as well as impose the same procedures 
for local authorities.  
 Ethnic grievances must be addressed through reconciliation processes and 
concerns of weak groups must be addressed with nonviolent solutions.
228
  These 
processes should not marginalize any salient ethnic group in order to prevent 
reoccurrence of ethnic conflict.  Minority rights must be guaranteed by the constitution 
and laws while discrimination be prohibited. With just and equal treatment through 
governmental and intervention activities, respect for cultural diversity must be devised.
229
  
There are generally two types of operations that support post-conflict 
reconstruction. The first type is peace keeping missions with prior agreement among the 
warring parties.  Peace enforcement operations, on the other hand, originated over the 
opposition of one or more of the indigenous factions.
230
  The first should be given priority 
with a comprehensive mandate. However, when one or more conflicting parties do not 
allow the chance of peace, the international community should not hesitate to launch 
peace-enforcing operations. 
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